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 The primary objective of this study is to determine what drives water planners to 
plan for the impacts of a changing climate. As the climate continues to change, climate 
scientists have projected changes in water quantities available for human and other uses. 
This multimethod study addresses these questions through three interlinked studies 
focusing on state level data and planning. 
 The first study examines how Americans form policy preferences on climate 
change. This question is particularly relevant in today’s environment of decreasing public 
support, especially from 2008 onward, for climate change initiatives even as climate 
scientists’ confidence in future global warming increases. Results from previous research 
reporting several significant predictor variables for climate change policy preferences 
including scientific knowledge, partisan identification, general environmental beliefs, and 
vulnerability are tested with contemporary data at the state level. I found that following 
the 2008 election, partisan identification became a much stronger predictor at the state 
level while the other predictors diminished in importance.  
 The second study examines how state water plans and state hazard mitigation 
plans address climate change. Plans were coded for the extent to which they address 
climate change in their calculations for future supply and demand. Multivariable Linear 





including statewide voting, vulnerability to climate change, and recent experience with 
droughts and natural disasters. The most significant predictor variable for both state water 
planning and state hazard mitigation planning was the statewide voting record. 
Democratic leaning states were much more likely to plan for climate change in their plans 
than were Republican leaning states. 
 The third study is a qualitative comparison of the Texas and California state water 
plans. These two states were chosen because of their political differences but otherwise 
largely similar challenges with water resources, projected decreases in available water 
resources due to climate change, similar water planning paradigms at the state level, and 
similar demographics. While Texas is maintaining a traditional water planning effort 
focusing on infrastructure construction and conservation, California is focusing on 
environmental protection, social equity, and has adopted a scenario based approach 
accounting for uncertainties not only from climate change but also from population 












"Western water agencies must handle the collusion between 19th century water law, 20th 
century infrastructure and 21st century population and climate change." 
Brad Udall 
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STATES, WATER, AND CLIMATE: WHO’S PLANNING FOR CHANGE? 
 
Political states have a long history of planning and building water resources 
infrastructure to meet the needs of their constituents dating back to the aqueducts built by 
ancient civilizations. Water resources planning by political states have been driven by 
several variables including politics but also water resource availability, population, and 
economic growth. In the US, the political states responsible for water planning are mostly 
state and local governments. This study will examine the extent to which different 
partisan compositions and policy preferences of elected leaders have led to different 
water planning paradigms particularly in the face of climate change. 
Scientists studying the Earth’s climate have increasingly concluded that the 
climate is changing as a result of human activities. For example, the United Nations 
chartered Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established in 1988 
“to provide the world with a clear scientific view on the current state of knowledge in 
climate change and its potential environmental and socio-economic impacts” (IPCC, 
2015, p. 1). As the body of evidence supporting anthropogenic climate change has grown 
within the scientific community, successive assessment reports have established with 
increasing confidence (to a point of near certainty) that anthropogenic, or human-caused, 
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climate change has occurred since the industrial age and the rate of change will very 
likely accelerate in the future (e.g., Solomon, 2007). Scientists have also shown changes, 
and are predicting increasing changes, in the quantity and location of fresh water 
resources around the globe and in the US. These changes present both challenges and 
opportunities for political institutions such as states, water districts, and other public 
agencies charged with managing our water resources.  
The work presented here will assess why political institutions with responsibilities 
for managing or supplying water resources are, or are not, responding to the challenges 
and opportunities posed by climate change in their planning and operational activities. To 
that end, the ultimate dependent variable for this work is the planning output of water 
management agencies, particularly at the state-level. Of particular focus are the state 
water plans produced by most western US states. The degree to which states are planning 
for a future that is different than the past, in that it captures the changing climate, will be 
examined and related to independent variables such as water resources’ vulnerability to 
change, experience of drought, public opinion on climate change, and the predominant 
political leanings of states. This analysis will draw on theory and prior research on 
climate impact to develop and test hypotheses regarding what drives states to either plan 
for, or not plan for, the changing climate.  
The results of this study will serve both practitioners and scholars. Those working 
with state risk management, natural resource management, city planning, environmental 
standards protection, and utility planning will be able to more effectively plan for water 
as a scarce resource. This study also speaks directly to scholars centered on climate 
change, sustainability, public policy, the intersection between science, policy making, 
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and urban planning, as well as those interested in risk perceptions and risk management. 
Moreover, the findings emphasize the importance of political considerations in 
addressing climate change in water planning. 
 
1.1 Justification 
Understanding what motivates policy makers to apply climate science in water 
management policies is important for two major reasons: (1) it will improve our ability to 
explain and predict water resource agencies behaviors and, more pragmatically, (2) it 
might strengthen our society’s capacity to apply climate science in water management, 
and, thereby, improve our societal capacity for scarce resources’ climate adaptation.  
Water management agencies exist at different levels of government and in the 
private sector. These agencies are responsible for providing water to water users ranging 
from residential consumers to large scale agricultural consumers. Examples of water 
management agencies include local public utility districts, state-level departments of 
water resources, and the Bureau of Reclamation at the federal level. There are also 
private sector companies engaged in water resources management. These agencies are 
generally understood by scholars to be risk adverse entities that tend to hold service 
reliability, i.e., access to safe and affordable water, above all other considerations and 
goals (Rayner, Lach, & Ingram, 2005). Customers expect high quality water to be 
available when they need it. The public’s tolerance for failure is very low, especially with 
regard to municipal water providers in the US, whose customers expect clean water when 
they turn on their taps. The barriers to implementing changes to successful procedures, or 
changes that are costly in an ongoing successful water management regime, are quite 
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high. Nonetheless, climate change has and will increase vulnerabilities in the water 
management area, and it will increase the risks that agencies managing this scarce 
resource will face. This is particularly the case in the semiarid western US, where the 
balance between water supply and demand is already stressed. Improving our 
understanding of what motivates, hinders, and supports changes in the planning and/or 
the operations of water management agencies will add to the field of political science. In 
particular, analyzing the relationship between politics including elected leaders, 
constituent preferences, and water planning will add to the understanding of how these 
risk-averse water management agencies operate and plan.  
From a more normative and pragmatic perspective, improving the ability of water 
management agencies to plan for and operate in a changing climate, is an important 
aspect of improving our societal ability to deal with changing climate. If we fail to plan 
and account for changes in our water supply stemming from a changing climate, such as a 
decreased availability of water, we jeopardize our way of life. 
 
1.2 Analysis of Prior Research 
The body of research on the application of climate science in water management 
is dominated by anecdotal evidence and qualitative studies that focus primarily on inputs 
to water management agencies regulations, rules, forecasts, and science. These studies 
focus less on the output that water management agencies produce based on scientific 
information and regulation inflow. For example, Pulwarty and Redmond (1997) used a 
semi structured interview strategy as they spoke with water managers in the western US 
to assess the extent to which water managers utilize climate forecasts in their work. They 
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found, similar to others, that water managers generally do not use climate forecasts in 
their work (e.g., Callahan & Miles, 1999; Rayner et al., 2005). Instead, most water 
management strategies are tied to standard operating procedures that prescribe actions 
based on observed conditions, such as reservoir levels, the time of year, and the amount 
of snow on the ground.  
Quantitative and large N research approaches in factors driving use of climate 
science in state water planning are rare. One atypical example of such an approach 
looking at the use of forecasts in water resources management, however, is a survey from 
the year 2000 (Dow, O'Connor, Yarnal, Carbone, & Jocoy, 2007; R. E. O'Connor, 
Yarnal, Dow, Jocoy, & Carbone, 2005). Water managers in South Carolina and the 
Susquehanna River Basin of Pennsylvania were given a written survey. The survey was 
designed to assess (1) the size of respondents’ water management responsibilities, (2) the 
perception of their own risk for system failure (e.g., not being able to supply their 
customers with water), and (3) the managers’ perception of climate and weather forecast 
skill. The survey response was substantial for both regions (N = 405 in Pennsylvania and 
N = 269 in South Carolina), allowing for a robust statistical analysis of the results 
(O’Connor et al., 2005). The results showed that only a small percentage of water 
managers used climate and/or weather forecasts for flood protection, water supply, and 
power generation in either state. Only 10-25% of the managers surveyed reported using 
forecasts to plan for future water storage needs, expanding distribution systems, adjusting 
reservoir levels, adjusting inventory supply needs, or similar uses. Two purposes showed 
higher forecast usage: 1) scheduling personnel for maintenance and construction, and 2) 
starting public information campaigns to conserve water. The O’Connor et al. (2005) 
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analysis showed that the perceived risk of system failure was significantly correlated with 
managers’ willingness to use climate forecasts in their decision-making. In other words, 
if a particular agency were at some risk of not meeting its water delivery or water quality 
requirements, it would be willing to seek new information (such as a climate forecast) to 
help make its decisions. The analysis also showed that agency size and the perception of 
forecast skill did not correlate strongly with actual use of, or willingness to use, climate 
forecasts. Therefore, O’Connor et al. (2005) conclude that application of climate science 
and forecasts in water management is more determined by perception of risk, particularly 
with recent experiences with extreme weather and climate, than by any improvements in 
forecasting skills or the potential value of climate science for the intended end user. 
These results are consistent with other studies that were more anecdotal and qualitative in 
nature with small samples and interview based methods (e.g., Pulwarty & Redmond, 
1997) in other parts of the country and world. 
Water supply systems’ vulnerability to failure is obviously related to variation and 
trends in water supply from, for example, groundwater or surface water supply from 
watersheds.  Many studies have examined vulnerabilities to water shortages. For 
example, a recent study by Averyt et al. (2013) examined stress on fresh water resources 
in the US. They developed a water supply stress index based on observed water use and 
supply at approximately 700 square miles (the standard 8 digit Hydrologic Unit Code 
scale used in the US). They applied their water supply stress index to both current 
supplies and water usage. Their results showed that the stress is greatest in the 
southwestern US. This is the same geographic region that expects to see the greatest 
declines in fresh water supply as a result of climate change.  
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 As noted above, much of previous research has focused on input to and planning 
by water management agencies. The studies described thus far largely assess whether 
climate science and forecasts are used as input at all to decision making. Much less 
attention has been paid to whether decisions that are made or output from water 
management agencies considering climate adaptation are significantly different than they 
would have been if they had not considered climate change.  
One recent example of a study focused on agency output related to climate 
change, but not specifically in water resources, is Babcock (2013). Babcock examined the 
state Hazard Mitigation Plans that each state is required to produce in order to be eligible 
for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) funding following a disaster. 
Each plan was assessed for its treatment of climate change using objective analysis 
techniques, such as word frequency analysis, and subjective techniques, such as assessing 
accuracy of climate change content. Among other things, Babcock found that coastal 
states have addressed climate change in their plans to a greater extent than landlocked 
states. 
 Looking more broadly, previous research has found coherent relationships 
between a) policy preferences of constituents and b) the policy choices of their elected 
government. Page and Shapiro (1983) and Monroe (1998) both examined this 
relationship using survey data to represent policy preferences of Americans and an 
analysis of laws passed by Congress to represent policy choices of the US government. 
As expected, Page and Shapiro found a general congruence between changes in public 
opinion and policy choices by the government. Monroe (1998) found a somewhat less 
consistent relationship between public opinion and policy choices of the government 
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representing that public. Page and Shapiro (1983) and Monroe (1998) suggest that 
constituent political preferences around climate change may impact how climate change 
science is used by water planners who are charged with supplying water to those 
constituents.  
 While the body of research on the application of climate science in water 
management and planning has provided a solid foundation that identifies predictor 
variables related to vulnerability and public opinion, it has also left significant 
opportunities for further research. In particular, an assessment of planning by water 
management agencies at the state-level and the extent to which they address (or do not 
address) climate change is still lacking. There is also an opportunity to explore the 
relationship of policy and planning output to the predictor variables.  
 
1.3 Research Question 
Previous research suggests water resource agencies will address climate change 
with their actions based on (1) vulnerabilities and (2) constituent support. The questions 
this study poses are the following: Is there evidence that water resources vulnerability to 
climate change motivates application of climate science in water planning? Is there 
evidence that political preferences about climate change policy from elected leaders or 
constituents motivate application of climate science in water planning? More basically, is 
there evidence that partisan political preferences motivate policy choices around climate 
change? These questions unify the studies presented in the succeeding chapters.  
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1.4 Research Design 
Three avenues of research are conducted to shed light on what could hamper or 
support a) the use of climate information and b) the willingness to address climate change 
through decisions and policies. The first study assesses the motivators including 
ideology, partisanship, and perception of risk for state populations’ willingness to take 
policy action to adapt to climate change (Chapter 2). The second study examines state 
water plans and state hazard mitigation plans, which are an output of state government, 
and the extent to which these plans address climate change (Chapter 3). The third and 
final study is a case study examining in more detail the water plans of two states with 
fundamental differences in their planning for the changing climate, California and Texas 
(Chapter 4). Chapter 5 then discusses conclusions across all three studies and their 






WHO WANTS TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT CLIMATE CHANGE? 
 
While atmospheric scientists have studied the Earth’s climate for over a century, 
the body of scientific evidence for anthropogenic changes in the observed and projected 
climate record is relatively recent. For example, the United Nations chartered 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established in 1988 and has 
produced a series of four assessment reports (with a fifth currently in progress). As the 
body of evidence supporting anthropogenic climate change has grown within the 
scientific community, successive assessments have reported with increasing confidence, 
to a point of near certainty, that anthropogenic climate change has occurred since 
industrialization and the rate of change will very likely accelerate in the future (Solomon, 
2007). For most of the past two decades, American public opinion roughly followed the 
building scientific confidence in attributing climate change to anthropogenic activities. 
However, since 2008, American public opinion has moved in the opposite direction – 
increasingly questioning climate science that is showing anthropogenic influences and 
souring toward policy initiatives to mitigate climate change (Pew, 2009, 2010). This 
decline in public support was particularly pronounced in 2008 and 2009 with public 
opinion reductions of 10-20% in both Pew Center and Gallup survey data. These 
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observations contrast with studies in political science that have shown the importance of 
experts in driving public opinion. For example, Page et al. (1987) showed that “experts” 
were able to influence public opinion on policy matters. This finding appears to be at 
odds with the trends in opinions on climate change within and outside the scientific 
community that we see from 2008 onward. The literature on climate change policy 
preferences is surprisingly well developed and has identified several independent 
variables that work together to explain much of the variance in American policy 
preferences on climate change prior to 2008. This literature will be reviewed in the next 
section. However, the rapid recent changes in public opinion call into question the 
continued validity of those previous results. The purpose of this chapter is to investigate 
these relationships at the state-level to assess if the independent variables other scholars 
have found to be significant at the individual-level are significant when aggregated to the 
state-level. This is important for determining policy preferences at the state-level for 
water planning (the subject of Chapter 3). Following a literature review of relevant 
theories posited by other scholars, I will present the data and regression based 
methodology for testing the relationships between predictor variables for climate change 
preferences at the state-level. Then I will present my results and offer a conclusion that 
the shaping of policy preferences related to climate change has changed. 
 
2.1 Theory 
Previous research on climate change policy preferences in the scholarly literature 
has reported several important predictor variables. While much of this research has been 
conducted in the past 15 years, the roots of this research extend back to 1960s research on 
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factors shaping the broader environmental interests of Americans. Since the science 
community first identified climate change as a policy relevant issue and began refining its 
results in the 1980s, social scientists have been studying people’s policy preferences  
related to climate change.  
O’Connor et al. (1999) studied American policy preferences and individual 
choices related to climate change. In particular, they used a 1997 mail survey distributed 
randomly to adult Americans to assess the importance of four predictor variables on two 
separate dependent variables – willingness to take certain voluntary actions to mitigate 
climate change (e.g., carpooling, buying fuel efficient cars) and support for policy 
initiatives to mitigate climate change (e.g., gas tax or cap and trade). The four categories 
of independent variables considered were demographics, attitude toward government, 
climate change risk perception, and general environmental beliefs. They found that all 
four categories of independent variables had explanatory power for each dependent 
variable. Importantly, they found that risk perception of system failure explained roughly 
equal amounts of variance in both dependent variables. Previous literature had 
established the importance of the other independent variables but risk perception was 
new. The results of O’Connor et al. (1999) built significantly on a framework by Dunlap 
and Van Liere’s (1978), which measured general environmental beliefs by showing the 
importance of also measuring risk perception for explaining attitudes toward climate 
change. In addition to the main finding, O’Connor et al. reported that “climate change is 
not a polarizing issue, but one about which most people are unclear on what government 
policies they should support” (1999, p. 467). This result that people are generally unclear 
on policy remedies to address climate change was supported by survey responses 
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showing the majority of respondents as indicating only mild support for six of the seven 
policy positions proposed in the study. Finally, the study reported that “knowledge about 
the causes of global warming is a powerful predictor of behavioral intentions, 
independent from believing that climate change will happen and have bad consequences” 
(O'Connor et al., 1999, p. 469).  
O’Connor et al. (2002) further explored the link between scientific knowledge and 
policy preferences in a survey based study examining the attitudes and behaviors of 
central Pennsylvanian residents. Central Pennsylvania is a major producer of coal. As 
such, the population faces economic risk from many proposed policies to address climate 
change. Interestingly, O’Connor et al. found that partisan identification was a statistically 
significant predictor of policy support, but not of individual voluntary action to address 
climate change. This is interesting in that individual voluntary actions were not driven by 
partisan identification. They also found that knowledge of the causes of climate change in 
particular, and education in general, werer significant predictors of support for climate 
change policy.  
Knowledge of climate science has been studied both as a stand-alone topic and as 
an independent variable predicting climate change policy preferences (e.g., O'Connor et 
al., 1999). Sterman and Sweeney (2007) examined basic knowledge of climate science 
and simple mass balance concepts, which are important for devising policies to address 
climate change, such as the relationship between greenhouse gas emissions and 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere. They used a short answer and multiple 
choice survey instrument. Their respondents consisted of 212 graduate students at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. They found a surprising lack of understanding of 
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basic concepts such as stock and flow, and mass conservation among a majority of the 
respondents. For example, they found “a large majority, 63%, assert[ed] atmospheric 
CO2 can be stabilized while emissions into the atmosphere exceed removal from it” 
(Sterman & Sweeney, 2007, p. 13). Sterman and Sweeney (2007) conclude that policy 
making and policy preferences are very problematic when a majority of the population 
and policy makers lack a rudimentary understanding of the concepts involved in the 
policy issue.  
Another possible variable driving policy preferences toward climate change is 
perceived or actual vulnerability to climate change. The impacts of climate change are 
not uniform in space and time. For example, rising sea levels will affect coastal areas but 
not inland areas. Decreases in fresh water supply are expected to occur mostly over the 
semiarid southwestern US, where water is already scarce, but not over much of the rest of 
the country. Trends and variability in time such as decreasing snow pack or major 
droughts may also affect risk perception. Thus, risk perception may be expected to 
depend, in part, on physical location and time. However, scholars have so far only found 
weak relationships between physical vulnerability to climate change and risk perceptions.  
Brody et al. (2008) used survey data in combination with weather and geospatial 
data to study variables explaining climate change risk perception (their dependent 
variable). Physical vulnerability variables included distance to coast, recent fires, 
property damage, local temperature trends, and location in floodplains. Social variables 
included Dunlap and Van Liere’s (1978) New Ecological Paradigm (NEP) scale and 
similar demographic data to O’Connor et al. (1999). They found that the physical 
vulnerability variables explained only about 4% of the variance in climate change risk 
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perception whereas the social variables explained about 40%. The later number is 
consistent with other studies presented here. Hamilton and Keim (2009) also examined 
the spatial variability of climate change risk. They utilized survey data from the 
Community and Environment in Rural America survey conducted by the Carsey Institute 
in 2007 to compare perceptions of climate change in nine rural American areas. Similar 
to Brody et al. (2008), they found small differences in perception between communities 
that are more vulnerable to climate change impacts compared to those that are less 
vulnerable. In particular, they found that respondents in mountain communities that have 
seen decreases in snowpack perceive major climate change impacts at about 10 
percentage points higher than other rural communities. Arcury and Christianson (1990) 
studied the impact of a major drought in Kentucky on environmental beliefs using the 
New Environmental Paradigm scale developed by Dunlap and Van Liere (1978). They 
surveyed Kentucky residents before (1984) and after (1988) a drought to assess changes 
in environmental beliefs that might be attributed to the drought they experienced. They 
found only very small changes between the two surveys. These studies indicate that in the 
US, at least to date, there is not a strong relationship between physical vulnerability and 
risk perception. 
The explanatory power of ideology and partisan identification on climate change 
beliefs has been studied and well established by scholars. McCright and Dunlap (2011), 
for example, examined Gallup polling data for 2001-2010. Over that 10 year period, they 
found that 69% of liberals but only 43% of conservatives believed global warming has 
already started to happen. They reported similar statistics for other measures of 
knowledge, perception, and policy preferences related to climate change. These findings 
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are consistent with what other polling data have shown (e.g., Pew, 2009, 2010). Findings 
on the relationship between partisan identification and climate change perception 
variables are similar to those reported for ideology and climate beliefs. In addition, 
McCright and Dunlap (2011) explored the conditional effects of education and climate 
science knowledge on both partisan identification and ideology. They found that both 
education and climate science knowledge exacerbated differences between liberals and 
conservatives, and between Democrats and Republicans. For example, when only 
respondents with college degrees are considered, 82% of liberals and 43% of 
conservatives report that they believe climate change is already occurring. Similarly, 
among those that self-report greater understanding of climate change, 83% of liberals and 
36% of conservatives report that they believe climate change is already occurring. These 
results suggest a polarization among well-educated Americans, roughly along party lines. 
McCright and Dunlap (2011) reported that this polarization has intensified over the 
decade that Gallup polled on these questions. Among Democrats, there is a small trend 
toward a greater belief that climate change is occurring, whereas far fewer Republicans 
believe this, particularly since 2008 (down from ~45% to ~30%). McCright and Dunlap 
(2011) speculate that this increasing polarization results largely from the influence of the 
media.  
McCright and Dunlap’s (2011) conclusions regarding polarization are at odds 
with the earlier findings of O’Connor et al. (1999) that Americans are not polarized on 
the issue of climate change. While some of this is likely the result of events that 
transpired in the years between the two studies, McCright and Dunlap’s (2011) dataset is 
quite simplistic compared to the O’Connor et al. study (1999). O’Connor et al. (1999) 
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utilized a Likert scale to assess willingness to change personal behavior and support 
different policy positions, whereas McCright and Dunlap (2011) had a single, binary 
dependent variable that measured a belief that global warming has already started 
happening. This limitation is significant and prevented a more thorough analysis of the 
extent of polarization around specific or general policy questions.  
Recently, Marquart-Pyatt et al. (2011) issued a call for additional research to 
better understand American policy preferences on climate change. They identified four 
areas for future research to better understand the drivers of American public opinion on 
climate change policy. First, they called for in-depth longitudinal survey data collection 
over a number of years designed to rigorously assess policy preferences, scientific 
knowledge, trust, and household mitigation actions. Second, they called for more 
research on the role of trust in shaping policy preferences. Marquart-Pyatt et al. (2011) 
advanced the concept of where people place their trust as a possible independent variable 
for climate policy preference. Third, they called for research into the effects of media and 
social networking on public opinion. Finally, they called for a better understanding of the 
relationship between opinion and personal behavior. This last point is particularly 
important if public policy continues to fail to address climate change, as changing 
personal behavior may be an alternative to addressing climate change through larger scale 
policy initiatives. 
Table 2.1 summarizes the literature reviewed here in chronological order. Figure 
2.1 summarizes the literature and the relationships between the studies considered here 
and their relationship to understanding American policy preferences on climate issues: 
the ultimate purpose of this chapter. The literature considered here has identified a 
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number of important independent variables and demonstrated their relationship to the 
dependent variable as shown in Figure 2.1.  
In order to assess the impact of policy preferences and politics on state water 
planning efforts, the unit of analysis in this study is state-level data. This study examines 
the extent to which independent variables found to be significant predictors of individual-
level policy preferences around climate change are significant at the state-level when data 
is aggregated to that level. Similar to many of the studies reviewed, the dependent 
variable for this study is policy preferences on climate change but at the state-level rather 
than the individual-level. Somewhat consistent with the literature reviewed, the 
independent variables are the following: presidential vote choice, general environmental 
beliefs, climate science knowledge, and physical vulnerability. Note that risk perception 
is excluded from this analysis for a lack of available data.  
Based on the theory presented earlier in the chapter, I hypothesize the following: 
 H1: State-level relationships – The relationships reported by previous 
researchers should be present at US state-level and, therefore, observable using statewide 
data.  
 H2: Climate policy preferences – Consistent with previous research, 
climate change policy preferences should exhibit significant relationships to partisanship, 
scientific knowledge, and general attitude toward the environment. Vulnerability to 
environmental risk should not exhibit a significant relationship. 
 H3: Changes over time – I hypothesize that the H2 relationships should be 




Data for this study come from several sources. The response variable, American 
policy preferences for climate change, is drawn from a recurring Pew Center survey 
conducted in 2007 and 2010 (Pew, 2007, 2010). The 2007 survey was conducted January 
10-15, 2007 and had 1708 respondents. The 2010 survey was conducted from October 
13-18, 2010 and had 2251 respondents. Respondents in both surveys were randomly 
selected and designed to approximate the national population.  
Each survey asked respondents, "Do you think global warming is a problem that 
requires immediate government action, or don’t you think it requires immediate 
government action?" (Pew, 2010). In 2007, 55% of respondents responded that 
immediate government action was required while 31% said government action was not 
required, and 11% responded that global warming was not a problem. Just 4 years later, 
the responses were markedly different with 44% of respondents responded affirmatively, 
29% negatively, and 24% responded that global warming was not a problem.  
Data from both surveys were aggregated (separately for each year) to the state-
level in order to study relationships at the state-level. These variables’ unit of analysis is 
aggregated state responses rather than individual responses. The aggregation permits the 
incorporation of other datasets at the state-level that are not present in the survey into this 
analysis. This also permits the use of data analysis techniques for interval level variables. 
Liu (2007) and others have discussed the potential problems, but have also demonstrated 
opportunities associated, with using aggregate data. In this case, the use of aggregate data 
permits the integrated analysis of data from different sources. Unfortunately, some states 
with small populations do not have a sufficient number of responses in the Pew Center 
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survey results to adequately represent a state. States with fewer than 25 respondents in 
the 2010 survey were excluded from the analysis (leaving 27 states). The results are not 
sensitive to the threshold (e.g., 25 respondents) selection. Of the included states, Oregon 
reported the highest number of positive respondents (63%) and Alabama the fewest 
(20%) in 2010. Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show affirmative survey results by state for 2010 
(Figure 2.2) and 2007 (Figure 2.3). 
Data for independent variables come from several sources. A different Pew 
Center survey provides data on scientific knowledge related to climate change (Pew, 
2009). Two thousand and one American adults were surveyed regarding their attitudes 
and perceptions of science. The survey was conducted from April 28, 2009 to May 12, 
2009 and was designed to be representative of the nation’s voters. The margin of 
sampling error was +/- 2.5%. This survey asked respondents, “What gas do most 
scientists believe causes temperatures in the atmosphere to rise?” (Pew, 2009). The 
correct answer is carbon dioxide. The state aggregated results will be used as a measure 
of climate change science knowledge in our study.  
The 2008 and 2012 election results and 2009 average education attainment are 
used as independent variables in this analysis (Census, 2011; FEC, 2012). In particular, 
the statewide vote for the 2008 Republican candidate, John McCain, and the 2012 
Republican candidate, Mitt Romney, are used to represent political preferences at the 
state-level. The percentage of state residents with a bachelor degree or higher in 2009 
represents the educational attainment statewide. Vulnerability to natural disasters is 
operationalized by the number of declared disasters by state from 1953 to 2011 (FEMA, 
2011). Finally, I use a state-by-state rating of environmental policies from Forbes 
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magazine considering state policies, public opinion, and the state of the environment to 
represent general attitude toward the environment (Wingfield & Marcus, 2007). 
 
2.3 Models 
This study employs multivariate linear regression (MLR) modeling to assess the 
relationship between the independent and dependent variables in 2007 and 2010. Separate 
models are developed for the 2010 and 2007 survey results in order to compare the 
results. The two equations are: 
 
Y07 = A + B1X1 + B2X2 + B3X3                                     (2.1) 
Y10 = A + B1X1 + B2X2 + B3X3                                     (2.2) 
 
where the dependent variables, Y07 and Y10, are the percent support for government 
action to address climate change in the 2007 and 2010 survey results, respectively. The 
predictor variables are X1, the vote percentage for John McCain in the 2008 presidential 
election, X2, the 2007 state environmental ranking, and X3, the 2009 percent correct for 
climate science knowledge. A similar model is constructed replacing the 2008 
presidential election results with the 2012 presidential election results to test changes 
over those four years. Other independent variables described in the previous section were 
tested in different linear models but did not contribute significant predictors and are, 




Table 2.2 reports the model results for the 2007 independent variable. Two of the 
three independent variables were significant at the 95% significance level using a once 
sided t significance test: climate science knowledge and the state green rating. The use of 
the one-sided test is appropriate given the theory expecting a positive correlation between 
these two predictor variables and climate change policy preference. The linear model 
explains 41% of the variance for the state-level data used in this study. These results are 
consistent with previous investigations by other scholars using individual-level data. 
Table 2.3 reports the model results for the 2010 independent variable. This model 
shows that, unlike in 2007, the only significant predictor is the presidential vote of 2008. 
This result was robust across models with different predictor variables and different 
thresholds for state respondent sample sizes. While previous studies have reported that 
partisan identification and ideology are significant predictors of climate policy 
preferences (e.g., McCright & Dunlap, 2011), none have shown that general 
environmental attitudes and scientific knowledge are insignificant. 
More MLR models were constructed to test relationships with other independent 
variables. Consistent with previous investigations, perceived physical vulnerability was 
not found to be a significant predictor for either year or in any combination with other 
independent variables (result not shown). Demographic data, such as education 
attainment, gender, and geography (e.g., urban vs. rural) that were found to be significant 
predictors in previous research were largely found to be insignificant in this analysis 
(results not shown). This result may be caused by the use of state-level analysis which 
tends to “wash out” significant differences at the individual-level when the average of 
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these independent variables is roughly similar across all states.  
Figure 2.4 and 2.5 show the effect displays for the two linear models reported 
above. Effect displays are tools for showing relationships between each predictor variable 
on the response variable across the range of values of the predictor variables (Fox & 
Weisberg, 2010). In each figure, an effect display plot is generated for each of the three 
predictor variables. The actual values for the predictor variables are shown as the hash 
marks along the abscissa. The best fit regression line is indicated in black whereas the red 
dashed envelope indicates the confidence in the MLR. A smaller area in the envelope 
indicates stronger confidence.  
In Figure 2.4, for the 2007 model, all three variables show a nonzero best fit 
regression line however; as expected from the tabular results, the confidence in the X1 
predictor variable (e.g., the 2008 presidential vote) is not sufficient to reject the null 
hypothesis that there is no effect from this variable. In contrast, both X2 and X3 show 
strong positive relationships with the Y07 response variable (e.g., 2007 climate policy 
preferences). 
Figure 2.5 paints a much different picture for the 2010 model. Here, X1 is 
strongly negatively related to the Y10 response variable (e.g., 2010 climate policy 
preferences) while the best fit line for X2 and X3 are both very nearly zero. The 
confidence envelope around X2 and X3, in this case, is quite large indicating that the 
probability that the true relationship between Y2 and X2 and X3 is zero, is substantial. 
These plots depict the dramatic difference between the 2007 and 2010 MLR model 
results with X2 and X3 clearly being much more significant in 2007 than in 2010 while 
X1 is more significant in the 2010 model. 
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Figure 2.6 shows the effect display for the 2010 model with the election result 
independent variable updated to the 2012 presidential election. Like the first 2010 model 
reported in Figure 2.5, this one shows election results as being the only statistically 
significant predictor variable. Further, the 2012 presidential election is an even stronger 
predictor than the 2008 presidential election.  
Returning to the hypothesis statements, H1 regarding the robustness of state-level 
relationships is largely confirmed by these results, with the exception of the demographic 
independent variables. Hypothesis H2 regarding the consistency of response and 
predictor variables with previous research results is largely confirmed for 2007, but 
rejected for 2010. Hypothesis H3, stating that relationships should be stable over time, is 
rejected in the face of these results.  
 
2.5 Conclusions 
Taken together, these results suggest that a fundamental shift in the way 
Americans are constructing their policy preferences related to climate change may be 
taking place, whereby partisan choice and/or ideology may be becoming a much more 
important predictor than in the past and other predictor variables important in the past are 
becoming less so. While the relationship in 2007 between the response and predictor 
variables reported here is similar to previous results reported in the literature, the 
relationship is fundamentally different in the results for 2010. In particular, the 
presidential vote is a much more significant predictor for 2010 than in 2007, while the 
other independent variables considered in the models presented here (as well as other 
variables in models not reported here) are far less significant in the 2010 results.  
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These results are, of course, only as good as the data included in the models. 
Certainly, the state-level data have larger uncertainty in the estimation of variable values 
than individual-level survey response data. The ability to tightly operationalize variables 
consistent with the theory is also more limited with state-level data than with individual 
survey questions especially for surveys that the researcher constructs specifically for the 
purpose of their inquiry. For example, the state green index rating used in this study is not 
as robustly developed for measuring general environmental attitudes as the widely cited 
and applied New Environmental Paradigm (NEP) scale (Dunlap & Van Liere, 1978). 
However, the similarity of the 2007 results to previous research results suggests that the 
state-level methodology used here is accurate if not precise. Further, the 2010 survey 
responses are consistent with the downturn in public opinion on climate change policy 
reported by Pew and others from 2008 onwards.  
More time and data are needed to assess the strength of this conclusion. In 
particular, additional surveys repeating the Pew question representing the dependent 
variable (e.g., respondent’s willingness to endorse government action to address climate 
change) would go a long ways toward validating the findings of this study and toward 
tracking changes in these drivers of public opinion across time. In the meantime, it is 
worth considering the political and economic changes in America in and since 2008, as 
well as media effects. The major economic recession and its impact on American politics 
and policy priorities certainly merit further investigation. Economic strain during 
recessions can clearly modify political preferences to be more focused on basic issues 
such as social services and jobs and away from issues like the environment. State-level 
analysis using economic data could follow this methodology. If economics are 
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responsible for driving the changes observed here, incorporating state-level economic 
data – especially changes in state economic conditions since 2007 - would be a useful 
avenue of future research.  
Political changes with the 2008 election of President Obama, backlash against his 
progressive platform, and perceived expansion of government may also have contributed 
to the changes in climate policy preferences reported here. In particular, the combination 
of a progressive president heralding from urban America with the election of a strongly 
Democratic and progressive Congress in 2008 shifted political power and discussion to 
policy areas and policy choices that had not been previously under discussion. The 
backlash in the conservative political ranks was strong, as evidenced by the rapid growth 
of the Tea Party and the major shift in the 2010 and 2014 Congressional elections. This 
political tension may have contributed to the results reported here. More data on state-
level political shifts would be useful for diagnosing this possibility. 
The effects of the media, in particular, the rapid growth of the politically 
conservative media, on climate change policy preferences have been the subject of much 
speculation in the literature (e.g., Marquart-Pyatt et al., 2011; McCright & Dunlap, 2011; 
Oreskes & Conway, 2010). Much of the media has reported on the climate change issue 
using the same horse race approach as it does with many other issues, giving equal time 
and attention to both sides even when there is near total consensus among experts, as is 
the case with climate change science. Furthermore, many have speculated on the impact 
of the growth of conservative media and its treatment of science issues such as climate 
change but also including stem cell research, evolution, and other science issues. In many 
instances, the conservative media has challenged consensus science on all of these issues 
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with pseudoscientific results being misrepresented as actual scientific output. This may 
amplify existing behaviors where voters utilize partisan identification as a schema for 
shaping opinion on complex issues such as climate change (e.g., Lodge & Hamill, 1986). 
This is clearly an area that needs further investigation. 
Finally, as Marquart-Pyatt et al. (2011) advocate, better understanding the policy 
preferences and choices of Americans is clearly an area ripe and important for future 
research. Understanding how those preferences and choices are formed, but also how 
they change over time, is important to broader questions of science and policy 
interactions but also for how public policy may ultimately address the changing climate. 
Observations such as the statement of O’Connor et al. (1999) that “climate change is not 
a polarizing issue, but one about which most people are unclear on what government 
policies they should support” need to be revisited.  
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Table 2.1: Chapter 2 literature summary 
 
(Dunlap & Van Liere, 1978) 
(Dunlap, Van Liere, Mertig, & Jones, 
2000) 
Developed New Ecological Paradigm 
scales to gauge public opinion toward 
environmental issues; documented change 
in perception in Washington State 
(Arcury & Christianson, 1990) Documented weak trends in environmental 
beliefs resulting from a major drought in 
Kentucky in the mid 1980s 
(O'Connor et al., 1999) Showed importance of climate change risk 
perception in explaining policy preferences 
and individual choices. Risk perception 
was shown to be about as important as and 
independent from general environmental 
beliefs. 
(O'Connor et al., 2002) Studied climate change policy preferences 
and willingness to take individual 
voluntary action in central Pennsylvania. 
(Sterman & Sweeney, 2007) Found a surprising lack of basic science 
knowledge among MIT graduate students 
in climate science and underlying concepts 
important for policy formation 
(Brody et al., 2008) Found weak relationship between physical 
vulnerability to climate change and risk 
perception 
(Hamilton & Keim, 2009) Found small differences in rural American 
communities on climate change perception 
that weakly correspond to climate trends 
(McCright & Dunlap, 2011) Used Gallup polling data to show 
polarization along partisan identification 
and ideology with respect to climate 
change. 
(Marquart-Pyatt et al., 2011) Call for additional research to improve 
understanding of the variables that shape 
public opinion on climate change policy. 
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Table 2.2: MLR Model results for 2007 climate policy preference. B estimates are the 
MLR coefficients, SE is the standard error, and P is the p values.  
Variable B Estimate SE P 
McCain 2008 -0.0012 0.0026 0.6407 
Green Index 2007 0.00433 0.0027 0.1186 
Climate knowledge 0.6324 0.3042 0.0485* 
Intercept 0.0121 0.2475 0.9615 




Table 2.3: MLR Model results for 2010 climate policy preference. B estimates are the 
MLR coefficients, SE is the standard error, and P is the p values.  
Variable B Estimate SE P 
McCain 2008 -0.0066 0.0028 0.0264* 
Green Index 2007 0.0002 0.0029 0.9351 
Climate knowledge 0.1093 0.3284 0.7422 
Intercept 0.6636 0.2671 0.0204* 
R2 = 0.3392, F-statistic = 4.107, * = significant at 95%, n = 27 
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Table 2.4: Modified 2007 MLR Model results replacing 2008 election results with 2012 
election results.  
Variable B Estimate SE P 
Romney 2012 -0.1776 0.2759 0.526 
Green Index 2007 0.0038 0.0029 0.199 
Climate knowledge 0.6359 0.3021 0.046* 
Intercept 0.0535 0.2626 0.840 





Table 2.5: Modified 2010 MLR model results replacing 2008 election results with 2012 
election results 
Variable B Estimate SE P 
Romney 2012 -0.7369 0.2961 0.0202* 
Green Index 2007 -0.0007 0.0031 0.8043 
Climate knowledge 0.0974 0.3242 0.7665 
Intercept 0.7473 0.2817 0.0139* 





Figure 2.1: Interactions of research on American climate policy preferences. Solid lines 





Figure 2.2: Percent of Pew (2010) respondents in each state stating that global warming 






Figure 2.3: Percent of Pew (2007) respondents in each state stating that global warming 





Figure 2.4: Effect display for 2007 MLR model described in text following Fox and 




Figure 2.5: Effect display for 2010 MLR model described in text following Fox and 




Figure 2.6: Effect display for modified 2010 MLR model with X1 as 2012 election 








STATES, WATER, AND CLIMATE 
 
Twenty-nine states have developed formal water plans to guide their future water 
supply and demand management and investments. Typically, these plans make both 
assessments and projections of current and future water demand and supply. The 
projections typically account for population, demographic, and economic changes 
anticipated by the state. Some states also consider the impact of a changing climate on 
their water supply and/or demand. The previous study (Chapter 2), explored the drivers 
for state-level policy preferences related to climate change. This study explores the 
drivers for state government policy choices, specifically regarding water resource 
management as represented by the state water plans. Independent variables representing 
vulnerability and political preferences will be tested as drivers of the choices made by 
states to either incorporate or not to incorporate climate change science into their state 
water plans. These results will be compared to a similar analysis with the state hazard 
mitigation plans to test for consistency or differences in how states approach planning for 




Scholars have shown that risk perception (e.g., O’Connor et al., 1999), ideology 
(e.g., McCright & Dunlap, 2011), and vulnerability (e.g., Brody et al., 2008) are 
predictors for individual policy choices related to addressing climate change. In Chapter 
2, I found that ideology or partisan political preference is the major predictor for policy 
preferences related to addressing climate change at the state-level using data aggregate 
and other state-level data. This study tests for predictors of policy preferences at the state-
level as represented by state water and hazard mitigation planning documents. Do state 
governments represent the majority opinion of their constituents in developing plans to 
address or not address climate change? Are there other predictors related to vulnerability 
or experience with hazards that come into play in predicting state planning documents? 
Broadly, previous research has found coherent relationships between policy 
preferences of constituents and the policy choices of their elected government. Page and 
Shapiro (1983) and Monroe (1998) both examined this relationship using survey data to 
represent constituent policy preferences and analysis of policy choices of the US 
government. As expected, Page and Shapiro found general congruence between changing 
public opinion and policy choices of the government. Monroe found a somewhat less 
consistent relationship between majority opinion and policy choices. Both studies found 
stronger congruence in policy areas most important to voters and less congruence in 
relatively obscure policy areas of less interest and visibility to voters and in policy areas 
such as campaign financing that directly impact politicians. Water policy tends to be 
somewhat obscure so long as the public does not feel threatened (Gleick, 1998). Thus, 
one might expect governments to make policy choices that respond more to 
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vulnerabilities than to political preferences of voters if the two areas are at odds.   
Although addressing climate change in state water planning has not been studied 
systematically, scholars have examined water planning efforts at different scales. 
Feldman (2013) for example, described water planning efforts to address climate change 
at different scales ranging from very local to global. He described planning efforts in 
Brazil where climate scientists were connected directly with farmers in the Amazon River 
Basin to promote the co-creation of scientific data for farmers to apply to their decision 
making. He also described planning efforts at the city level in Los Angeles and Tokyo to 
address climate change and noted that these efforts have already demonstrated some 
success. In Los Angeles, for example, total water demand is about the same in 2013 as in 
1980 even though there has been has increase of over a million people.  
Outside of water planning specifically, scholars have also studied the use of 
climate change science in state planning efforts for hazard mitigation. For example, 
Babcock (2013) examined the State Hazard Mitigation Plans that each state in the US is 
required by the Disaster Mitigation Act (DMA) to produce in order to be eligible for 
FEMA funding following a disaster. Each plan was assessed for its treatment of climate 
change using objective analysis techniques such as the presence of a climate change 
section and subjective techniques such as assessing the accuracy of any climate change 
content. States were assigned a one to four ranking characterizing their treatment of 
climate change. Category one meant there was no discussion of climate change or the 
discussion was inaccurate. Category four meant there was a “thorough discussion of 
climate change impacts on hazards and climate adaptation actions” (Babcock, 2013, p. 5).  
Babcock used these rankings to draw qualitative conclusions on the relative importance 
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placed on climate change in assessing future hazards in the state planning efforts. Among 
other things, he found that coastal states have addressed climate change in their plans to a 
greater extent than landlocked states. This was partially explained by the increases in sea 
level and greater exposure to coastal hazards such as storm surges. Both have increased 
in recent years and are expected to further increase in future years.  
Other scholars have taken a broader approach to studying hazard mitigation and 
emergency plans. For example, Berke, Smith, and Lyles (2012) evaluated the overall 
quality of each of the coastal states’ hazard mitigation plan. They evaluated the plans 
based on six principles articulated in the DMA: goals, fact base, mitigation policies, 
implementation and monitoring, interorganizational coordination, and participation. The 
plans were scored using content analysis and the six criteria. The authors found the 
overall quality of state hazard mitigation plans to be moderate to low. They speculated 
that the variance between state’s scores might be explained by, among other variables, 
experience with recent disasters or vulnerability to future disasters. Although Berke, 
Smith, and Lyles (2012) did not explicitly address the topic of climate change, nor did 
they test any of their possible explanations of the state-to-state variance, they did suggest 
that changing vulnerabilities may be a factor in predicting plan scores.  
Water planning at the state level and state water plans, in particular, have not 
received the same level of attention as hazard mitigation or emergency planning. In 
general, water resources planning has relied on engineering approaches in its planning of 
water resources infrastructure projects, estimating expected or known water demands 
based on historical data for water supplies such as precipitation and stream gage records 
(e.g., Dunne and Leopold, 1978). However, these traditional planning efforts do not 
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typically account for the potential impact of climate change on water supplies or 
demands. Snover, Hamlet, and Lettenmaier (2003) described the potential for climate 
change scenarios to inform water planning efforts at the local levels. More recently, 
Gober et al. (2010) documented the need for water management agencies to incorporate 
climate change impact scenarios especially in the semiarid southwestern US where 
climate change is expected to diminish an already scarce water supply. Indeed, in recent 
years, major agency water studies have started to incorporate climate change scenarios 
(e.g., Prairie & Jerla, 2012). 
At the same time, scholars have examined water availability and vulnerabilities of 
water supply systems. For example, Padowski and Jawitz (2012) examined the water 
supplies of America’s 225 largest cities for current and future availabilities. They 
concluded that the supplies, particularly in the southwestern US, are at risk as climate and 
population patterns change. Similarly, Averyt et al. (2013) examined stress on surface 
water supplies both presently and in the future, and concluded that the southwestern US 
was particularly at risk. The recent third national climate assessment (Melillo, Richmond, 
& Yohe, 2014) synthesized this literature and concluded that the key message for climate 
change impacts in southwestern US was that there will be reduced streamflows and a 
reduced snowpack in the region. In the northwestern part of the US, the key message was 
also water-related challenges but in a different direction.  
At the state-level, state water plans have increasingly been adopted mostly by 
western states in the US to plan for their future water needs. Currently, a majority, 29, 
states have adopted water plans. These plans have not been systematically studied by 
scholars the way that hazard mitigation plans have. Perhaps this is because 
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comprehensive water planning at the state-level is generally (with significant exceptions) 
speaking a more recent and more varied phenomenon than water planning at the project 
level, or hazard mitigation and emergency planning at the state-level. Nonetheless, state 
water plans articulate state policy preferences around an important resource issue and are, 
therefore, a worthy target for research. Of particular interest here are the assumptions that 
go into future water supply and demand scenarios for which states plan. Future water 
supply scenarios traditionally assume past supplies will be available in the future. Future 
water demand scenarios are traditionally based on population and/or economic scenarios, 
particularly for agriculture as it uses the vast majority of water across western states. 
Climate change assessments focusing on water resources, however, have projected with 
increasing confidence that water supplies will change as the climate continues to change 
(e.g., Georgakakos et al., 2014). Water supplies in some places like the American 
southwest will diminish while they may increase in others. Furthermore, these 
assessments suggest that water demand will also change as a result of the changing 
climate; as temperatures increase, there will be increased demand for water for cooling 
and for agriculture as more water evaporates. To what extent these projected changes are 
being accounted for in water plans and understanding what motivates some states to 
account for these changes more so than others are important questions for practitioners 
and scholars alike.  This study tests those motivations with the following hypotheses: 
 H3.1: States will account for the impacts of climate change on their water 
resource portfolio (h1) based on the vulnerability of those resources to a changing climate 
(v1), public support for adopting policies to adapt to a changing climate (v2), and elected 
officials’ support for adopting policies to adapt to a changing climate (v3). This is 
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represented as follows: 
 
h1= (v1+v2+v3) + E                                                (3.1) 
 
The dependent variable is the degree to which climate change is addressed by the 
state water plan. Independent variables considered are vulnerabilities of water resources 
to climate change, the partisan election outcome in each state, and public support for 
climate change policy. The latter was the dependent variable in the prior study (presented 
in Chapter 2).  
To provide a comparison with the state hazard mitigation planning realm, I further 
hypothesize that: 
 H3.2: States will account for the impacts of climate change on their hazard 
mitigation portfolio based on trends in disasters (h2), public support for adopting policies 
to adapt to a changing climate (v2), elected officials support for adopting policies to adapt 
to a changing climate (v3), and number of recent disasters (v4). 
 
h2 = (v2 + v3+ v4) + E                                               (3.2) 
 
3.2 Methods and Data 
Ordinal logistic regression modeling is used to test the relationships between the 
dependent variables (e.g., degree to which states address impact of climate change on 
water plans and hazard mitigation plans) and the independent variables considered in this 
study. Data are drawn from a number of sources as well as developed from content 
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analysis.  
Data for the dependent variable, h1, were drawn from a content analysis of state 
water plans. These plans were downloaded directly from the states that have them. Of the 
29 states with water plans, 20 have produced an updated plan within the past five years. 
These plans vary in complexity and detail. Plans range from less than 100 pages in length 
to well over 1,000 pages. The plans also vary in their content. Most plans make 
quantitative assessments of current water usage, water demand, and water supply as well 
as projections of future water demand and supply. Table 3.1 provides information on the 
state water plans used in this study.  
Many states also have drought plans and they were initially considered as a 
potential data source for this study. However, after initially analyzing several drought 
plans, it became apparent that these plans were much less current and much more process 
focused than the water resource plans. Many of the state drought plans were more than 1 
or 2 decades old, making them less likely to address climate change issues simply based 
on when they were written. Furthermore, unlike state water plans, which generally 
include quantitative outlooks and assessments of variables related to climate change, 
drought plans mostly focus on the decision-making process for the state to declare a 
drought. 
In order to compare results between the state water plan hypothesis (h1) and the 
state hazard mitigation plan hypothesis (h2), Babcock’s (2013) four category content 
analysis procedure was applied to the state water plans to assess the degree to which 
climate change is accounted for in the plan. Babcock’s (2013) study also included 
descriptive data on attributes of the state hazard mitigation plan including publication 
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year, source, summary, summary of climate change presentation, mentions of climate 
change adaptation, etc. The state water plans in this study were also coded for this kind of 
descriptive data. Although Babcock’s analysis was not as rigorous as other evaluations of 
state hazard mitigation plans (e.g., Berke et al., 2012), its focus on addressing impacts of 
climate change and its relatively simple methodology lent itself to replication here.  
A coding scheme was developed based on the methodology described by Babcock 
(2013). This scheme is included in the Appendix. The coding scheme was tested 
independently by three coders on four state hazard mitigation plans randomly chosen 
from each of Babcock’s four categories. The results of the intercoder reliability test are 
shown in Table 3.2. Of the 12 coding attempts, 9 of the categories assigned matched 
those assigned by Babcock (2013). The three coding mismatches or “discrepancies” 
pertained to states that Babcock (2013) had assigned a category of two or three, and those 
“discrepancies” were only one category off from Babcock’s designation (e.g., the 
category assigned by the coder was only one level different from what Babcock has 
assigned). The overall error rate was 3/12 or 25% but the coding for the extreme 
categories (one and four) was perfect. This error rate translates to an overall percentage 
agreement rate of 75%, which is within the range of 70% to 97% of intercoder reliability 
for state plan evaluations reported by others (Berke & Godschalk, 2009).   
The coding scheme was then applied to the 29 water plans in order to assign 
categorical rankings to each water plan. Those rankings are reported in Table 3.3 together 
with Babcock’s (2013) rankings of the state hazard mitigation plans. The results of both 
rankings are also presented geographically in Figure 3.1 (state hazard mitigation plan 
rankings) and Figure 3.2 (water plan rankings). The correlation coefficient between the 
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two rankings for the 29 states that have both plans is 0.51.  
Data for independent variables are drawn from multiple sources. Constituent 
support for policies to address climate change (v2) is drawn from the Pew survey data 
used in Chapter 2 (Pew, 2007, 2010). As in Chapter 2, these data are aggregated to the 
state-level. Voting data (v3) are drawn from the Federal Elections Commission dataset 
used in Chapter 2 (FEC, 2012). Also following Chapter 2, disaster data comes from 
FEMA (FEMA, 2011). 
Nationally consistent data on state water resources availability and water resource 
vulnerability (v1) to climate change is not readily available. Recognizing this challenge, 
Congress in 2009, through the SECURE Water Act, directed the US Geological Survey 
to conduct a  “national water availability and use assessment program” that would, 
among other things, “provide a more accurate assessment of the status of the water 
resources of the US” (USGS, 2015). Unfortunately, these data do not yet exist, requiring 
a different approach for obtaining data for v1. Of course, the state water plans themselves 
often provide this assessment. However, as described previously, the plans vary greatly in 
their level of detail and the manner in which they describe current and future water 
availability. Furthermore, since those plans are the focus of this study and the data from 
which the dependent variable is drawn, it would not be appropriate to use them to also 
define the independent variables. Instead, to obtain consistent data independent from the 
state water plans on a national scale, I turn to two sources: (1) Padowdki and Jawitz’s 
(2012) study of the water resources availability and vulnerability for the nation’s 225 
largest cities, and (2) the 2014 National Climate Assessment (Melillo et al., 2014). 
Padowdki and Jawitz (2012) assessed both current and future water supplies 
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relative to demand for the 225 largest cities in the US. They considered surface water 
supplies including streams, major rivers, lakes, and reservoirs as well as groundwater to 
develop a water availability index with a value for each of the 225 cities. They then 
assessed the water demand based on populations and use patterns to make a categorical 
assessment of each city’s future vulnerability. To overcome the lack of nationally 
consistent water resources data, this study relied on a number of assumptions to develop 
its availability index. Significantly among these are the following: the inability to 
represent the intricacies of the water management infrastructure, including water transfers 
between rural, agricultural, and urban entities.  
Nonetheless, the Padowdki and Jawitz (2012) water availability index is 
consistent across the country. I utilized this index to create a statewide index by 
averaging the availability values from the cities in each state to create a state availability 
index. This index is plotted in Figure 3.3. In addition to the limitations of the Padowski 
and Jawitz (2012) city index, this index has at least two more important limitations: first 
and foremost, this index does not reflect agricultural or rural water resource availability. 
In most states, those water uses are larger than the urban water uses. However, at a state 
or regional level, water resources availabilities and particularly vulnerabilities are broadly 
consistent. Second, states have widely differing numbers of the 225 urban areas within 
their boundaries. Some states (e.g., Wyoming) do not have any urban areas whereas 
others have many (California alone has thirty). Given these limitations, the state-level 
data derived from Padowdsi and Jawitz (2012) will be used cautiously in considering 
water availability at the state-level. That said, this index does present a regionally 
appropriate picture of water availability with the least availability in the semiarid 
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southwestern US – especially Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah; and the greatest 
availability in the Gulf Coast states, the midwest, and the Pacific northwest. At least at 
that level, this dataset accurately reflects regional patterns of water availability lending 
support for its use in this study. 
The second study used to inform analysis of state water availability and 
vulnerability at the state level is the third National Climate Assessment; in particular, the 
chapter on water resources (Georgakakos et al., 2014). Although the National Climate 
Assessment does not provide state-level data, it does provide an assessment of the regions 
where water resources are expected to be most impacted by climate change. Figure 3.4, 
for example, shows the major river basins in the western US and the expected changes in 
their discharge resulting from three climate change scenarios. The major rivers in the 
southwestern US are expected to see dramatic declines in streamflow, while those in the 
northwest are expected to see increases. While the magnitude of change is dependent on 
the climate change scenario, the direction of change (e.g., increase or decrease) is 
consistent across the scenarios. While these data are not available at the state level, the 
general pattern of southwestern states expected to experience a declining water resource 
with climate change will be used to inform a qualitative discussion about southwestern 
states and how they address climate change in their water plans. 
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 show the independent variables used in this study as a 





The following ordinal logistic regression models are used: 
 
h1= (v1+v2+v3) + E                                                 (3.3) 
 
h2= (v2+v3+v4) + E                                                 (3.4) 
 
Ordinal logistic regression models which were chosen as the dependent variables 
in both cases are ordered categorical variables with no defined zero and no consistent 
interval between defined categories. In both the water plan (Equation 3.3) and state 
hazard mitigation plan (Equation 3.4) models, data are available and used for the entire 
population. This means that probability sampling methods are not necessary.  
For water plans (Equation 3.3), the model was run with only 26 states that have 
both water plans and a water availability index. For the state hazard mitigation plans 
(Equation 3.4), the model was run for all 50 states. Many permutations to the model were 
tested including running them on subsets of the states, using somewhat different 
representations for variables, and including different variables altogether in order to test 
for consistency of results. The models reported here utilize the 2010 Pew survey results 
for v2 and the 2012 presidential vote for v3. Similar results were reported when the model 
used the 2008 presidential vote for v3 or the 2007 Pew survey results for v2. Similarly, 
additional models were tested with other independent variables used in Chapter 2 but 
none of these independent variables were found to be significant.    
I also used ordinary Multivariate Linear Regression (MLR) models similar to 
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those used in Chapter 2. While the MLR model results were more straight forward to 
interpret, the ordered categorical nature of the dependent variables make the ordinal 
logistic models a more appropriate (and conservative) choice for this study. 
 
3.4 Results 
Ordinal logistic regression model results for the water plan model are reported in 
Table 3.4 and for the state hazard mitigation plan model are shown in Table 3.5. For the 
water plan model (Equation 3.3), regression coefficient values (B estimate) for the 
Rep2012 and Avail variable are similar to their corresponding standard error estimates 
indicating significant relationships. For Rep2012, the -5.39 B estimate indicates that a 1% 
increase in vote for the Republican presidential candidate reduces the log odds of 
incorporating climate science into the state water plan by 5.39. Similarly, for water 
vulnerability, the 0.38 B estimate indicates that 1% increase in water availability reduces 
the log odds of incorporating climate science into the state water plan by 0.036. 
Interestingly, for public opinion, the standard error estimate is much greater than the B 
estimate indicating that this variable is much less significant in predicting the water plan 
ranking. The model confidence intervals provide another estimate of the relative 
importance of the independent variables. Independent variables whose confidence 
intervals do not cross zero are considered insignificant. For the water plan model (3.3), 
Rep2012 is the only independent variable that intersects zero. Since the model utilizes the 
full population of state-level data, the p values reported are not as indicative of 
significance as they would be in a study using a data sampling strategy such as that in 
Chapter 2. Therefore, I conclude that the Republican vote and the water availability are 
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both significant predictor variables for the water plan rankings (e.g., the 1-4 rankings 
described earlier). 
For the state hazard mitigation plan model (3.4), Rep2012 independent variable 
emerges as the most significant predictor variable. Its regression coefficient (B estimate), 
-15.62, is much greater than its standard error (4.02) and its confidence interval is very 
narrowly centered near zero. The standard errors for the other two independent variables 
in that model are much greater than their regression coefficient and their confidence 
intervals do not intersect zero. Therefore, I conclude that the state Republican vote is the 
only significant predictor variable for the state hazard mitigation plan rankings. 
The similarities between the water plan model results and hazard mitigation 
model results are striking. Although the models included different independent and 
dependent variables as well as different configurations of states, both models showed the 
presidential vote as a significant predictor variable for the state water and hazard 
mitigation plans. 
These results are consistent with a qualitative inspection of the states in the region 
most at risk of reduced water supplies as reported by the Climate Assessment 
(Georgakakos et al., 2014). This region is the southwestern US (e.g., Figure 3.4). This 
region includes Arizona, New Mexico, Utah, and Nevada, which are all states with a 
water plan ranking of one, meaning they did not account for climate change at all in their 
water plans. However, this region also includes California, Colorado, and Oklahoma. 
These are states which have a water plan ranking of four. Similarly, in regions with less 
risk to their water supply decreasing, as a reported impact of climate change in the 
National Climate Assessment, there are states that span the four rankings for water plans. 
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This qualitative analysis is consistent with the water plan ordinal logistic regression 
model showing a significant relationship with the presidential vote, but apparently, also at 
odds with the model result showing a significant relationship with water 
availability/vulnerability.  
Recall the hypotheses presented in this study, H3.1 and H3.2, predicted that states 
would incorporate climate change projections in their water plans (H3.1) and hazard 
mitigation plans (H3.2) based on the vulnerability of those resources to a changing 
climate (v1 and v4), public support for adopting policies to adapt to a changing climate 
(v2), and elected officials support for adopting policies to adapt to a changing climate 
(v3). These results require the partial rejection of both hypotheses, H3.1 and H3.2. Of the 
three variables hypothesized to be significant predictors for each of the dependent 
variables, only the policy preferences of elected politicians, (imperfectly) represented by 




A speculative conclusion to be drawn from these results is that state plans (both 
for water and hazards) respond more to the political party of elected politicians (as 
reflected by the presidential vote) than they do to the policy preferences of the people or 
the vulnerability of the state to the natural phenomena of interest. Clearly, there are 
exceptions to this (e.g., Oklahoma’s water plan ranking of four). I also again emphasize 
that this study does not perfectly represent any of the variables. Nonetheless, this study 
suggests additional data and analysis on both the impact of elected political leaders at the 
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state-level, on their planning efforts as well as the apparent lack of impact of the 
changing climate, and the policy preferences of the state constituents would all be fruitful 
avenues to pursue. Additionally, as the rate of climate change increases and impacts to 
water resources become more apparent, particularly in the southwestern US, the 
management and planning efforts of those states should be followed to assess when and 
how there are changes that are responsive to the emerging realities of reduced water 
resources in that region. 
Although the contents of the water plans themselves are apparently less driven by 
a state’s vulnerability to shortages in water resources, the existence of a water plan might 
be. As noted earlier, western states are far more likely to have a water plan than are 
eastern states. This pattern follows qualitatively the regions that are currently 
experiencing the greatest challenges with water supply. The southwestern states have 
dealt with the semiarid climate that has existed throughout their history. As water 
demands have grown during the 20th century, these states have a history of making 
difficult decisions to balance water supply and demand. The southwestern states are also 
most at risk for reductions in water supplies and challenges with water resources as 
described by the National Climate Assessment. Furthermore, within the western US, 
states with no plan (e.g., Washington) or older plans (e.g., Idaho), tend to be northern 
states with less risk of reducing water supplies than their southern counterparts. Perhaps 
vulnerability (v1), therefore, is a predictor for the existence of a water plan more than the 
contents of a water plan.  
These results are relevant for the water resources practitioner who often views his 
or her work as separate from the political world. As water resources agencies continue to 
 53 
grapple with meeting the challenges imposed by climate change, these results suggest 
that they will also have to meet the challenges imposed by the political system they 
operate within and, in particular, the policy preferences related to climate change of the 
political leadership they serve. Should Republican states continue to not incorporate 
climate change into their planning efforts, this will add an important obstacle for water 
resource planners charged with ensuring their constituents will have reliable sources of 









Table 3.1: State water plans used in study 






MAPPING THE FUTURE OF 
ALABAMA WATER RESOURCES 






AK       
AZ 
Arizona’s Next Century: A Strategic 




AR Arkansas Water Plan http://arkansaswaterplan.org/ 2014 
CA California Water Plan http://www.waterplan.water.ca.gov/ 2013 
CO Colorado Water Plan http://coloradowaterplan.com/ 2014 
CT      
DE       
FL Florida Water Plan http://www.dep.state.fl.us/water/waterpolicy/fwplan.htm 2013 
GA Georgia's State Water Plan http://www.georgiawaterplanning.org/ 2008 
HI Hawaii Water Plan http://dlnr.hawaii.gov/cwrm/planning/hiwaterplan/ 2008 






IL      
IN      











KY      
LA      
ME      
MD      
MA      
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MS      
MO Missouri Water Plan http://www.dnr.mo.gov/env/wrc/statewaterplanmain.htm various 





NE      
NV Nevada State Water Plan http://water.nv.gov/programs/planning/stateplan/ 1999 











Working Toward Solutions: 









NY      
NC      





OH      
OK Oklahoma Comprehensive Water Plan 
http://www.owrb.ok.gov/suppl
y/ocwp/ocwp.php 2012 
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nt in 2009 





TN      
TX Water for Texas https://www.twdb.texas.gov/waterplanning/swp/ 2012 
UT Utah Water Resources: Planning for the Future 
http://www.water.utah.gov/w
aterplan/SWP_pff.pdf 2001 
VT      







WA      





WI      






Table 3.2: Intercoder Reliability Test. Coding schema test results from three independent 
coders on four state hazard mitigation plans and comparison to categories assigned by 
Babcock (2013). 
State Babcock Coder 1 Coder 2 Coder 3 
WY 1 1 1 1 
NH 4 4 4 4 
NJ 3 3 4 4 






Table 3.3: Cross tabulated rankings for state hazard mitigation plans (from Babcock, 
2013) and state water plans 
SHMP -> 
WP 1 2 3 4 
1 GA, MO, NV, NM, ND, SD, WY 
AZ, ID, IA, UT, 
VA FL, NJ  
2 AL KS, SC, TX WV  
3 MT AR, PA MN HI 







Table 3.4: Ordinal logistic regression model results for water plan model (h1). B estimates 
are the regression coefficients, SE are the standard errors, t are the t-test values, OR are 
the odds ratios, and CI are the confidence intervals. 
 
Variable B SE t OR CI(2.5%) CI(97.5%) 
Romney 2012 (v3) -3.04 4.63 -0.657 0.048 0.00 417 
Water availability (v1) 0.030 0.30 1.03 1.03 0.98 1.09 
Public support (v2) 1.80 3.27 0.534 6.04 0.08 4460 




Table 3.5: Ordinal logistic regression model results for state hazard mitigation plan 
model (h2). B estimates are the regression coefficients, SE are the standard errors, t are 
the t-test values, OR are the odds ratios, and CI are the confidence intervals. 
Variable B SE t OR CI(2.5%) CI(97.5%) 
Romney 2012 (v3) -15.62 4.02 -3.89 0.00 0.00 0.0004 
NDisaster (v4) 0.005 0.017 0.323 1.01 0.97 1.04 
Public support (v2) 1.86 2.48 0.749 6.40 0.05 8.29 






Figure 3.1: State hazard mitigation plan rankings for addressing impacts of climate 





















Figure 3.4:  Annual and seasonal streamflow projections based on scenarios with 
substantial emissions reductions, gradual reductions from current emission trends 
beginning around midcentury, and continuation of current rising emissions trends. 
Scenarios are for eight river basins in the western US. The panels show percentage 
changes in average runoff, with projected increases above the zero line and decreases 
below. Projections are for annual, cool, and warm seasons, for three future decades 
(2020s, 2050s, and 2070s) relative to the 1990s. Reprinted with permission from USBR 






Figure 3.5: State water plan rankings (WP Ranking) as a function of independent 
variables used in ordinal logistic model: 2012 presidential vote (Rep2012), water 
availability index (Avail), and 2010 public support for climate change adaptation policies 








Figure 3.6: State hazard mitigation plan rankings (SHMP Ranking) as a function of 
independent variables used in ordinal logistic model: 2012 presidential vote (Rep2012), 
number of disasters (NDisaster), and 2010 public support for climate change adaptation 













TWO BIG STATES; TWO DIFFERENT APPROACHES 
 
Two of the nation’s largest states, California and Texas, share recent experience 
with major drought, growing urban populations, major agricultural industries requiring 
water supplies, and increasing vulnerability of diminishing water resources due to 
predicted future climate change. California and Texas both have adopted detailed water 
plans in 2012 and 2013 and have committed billions of dollars to address these 
challenges. While they share these similarities, the two states have taken dramatically 
different approaches to addressing climate change in their water planning. California has 
addressed climate change head on in its plan through sophisticated scenario development, 
utilizing the best available science to inform its plans. By contrast, Texas described a 
single meeting held as part of their planning process to discuss the possibility of climate 
change adversely affecting its water supply and noted that further research is required.  
The previous two studies, in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, have shown a relationship 
between state voting records and state preferences for policies mitigating or adapting to 
changing climate. States with larger percentages of votes for the Republican presidential 
candidate are less likely to address climate change in their state plans for water and 




prefer policies to address climate change (Chapter 2). Other predictors such as the state’s 
vulnerability to drought or natural disasters are not significant predictors of policies that 
consider climate change in relation to water resources. California and Texas are cases in 
point with regard to this relationship. Despite their similar experiences with recent 
drought and vulnerabilities to future change, California has been a steadfast supporter of 
Democratic presidential candidates while Texas has supported Republican presidential 
candidates. 
This chapter presents a comparative case study analysis of water resources 
planning in Texas and California to (1) illuminate more deeply how the two states 
describe and address climate change, and (2) elucidate their philosophies toward risk and 
addressing uncertainty.   
This chapter begins with a discussion on methodology including motivations for 
the case study approach and case selection. Then, differences and similarities between the 
cases are outlined, particularly political differences, similarities with recent drought 
experience, vulnerability to diminishing water resources, demographics, and state 
government sophistication. Finally, the water plans themselves are compared including a 
focus on their treatment of risk and addressing uncertainty both for climate change and 
other inputs to water planning.  
 
4.1 Methodology 
The case study method is well suited to this problem as it allows detailed 
exploration to establish rich explanations (George & Bennett, 2005). It is particularly 




analyses employed in Chapters 2 and 3. Whereas Chapter 3 validated a general 
hypothesis identifying an independent variable (political preference) predicting the 
dependent variable (state water plan addressing climate change), this study will delve 
more deeply into two particular water plans in order to test for finer scale differences in 
how they describe climate change and what their philosophies are toward risk and 
uncertainty.  
Texas and California were chosen as case studies to further illuminate the impact 
of their political differences on their water planning particularly given their similarities in 
size, population, and water issues. Although certainly not identical, Texas and California 
share many similarities in population, experience with recent extreme drought, 
vulnerability to climate change, crossing water supply and demand curves, and growing 
cities. These similarities and differences are further described below. 
Following discussion of the independent variables, the water plans themselves are 
examined in detail particularly for assessing their philosophy of risk and uncertainty both 
for climate change and for other inputs to the states’ water planning including population 
change and urban growth. This allows for analysis of different approaches to uncertainty 
to different inputs in order to test if climate change uncertainty is being treated differently 
from other sources of uncertainty.  
 
4.2 Political Differences 
An important difference between Texas and California is their approach to 
government and politics. One piece of evidence for this difference is their voting records. 




California voted for the Democratic candidate. In contrast, solid majorities (between 56 
and 59%) of voters in Texas have voted for the Republican candidate (FEC, 2012). In the 
2012 election, 60% of California voters voted for President Obama while only 41% of 
Texas voters did.  
Political differences are also evident at the state government level. Figure 4.1 
shows the partisan composition of the state legislature since the National Conference on 
State Legislatures began archiving data in 2009 (NCSL, 2015). In California, Democrats 
have held solid majorities in excess of 60% in both houses of the state legislature. In the 
same period, Democrats have also held all state wide offices including the governorship. 
California is currently one of only six states where Democrats have control of the state 
legislature and the governorship. In Texas, the situation is essentially reversed. 
Republicans have dominated the state legislature with solid majorities there. They also 
control the governorship making Texas one of 23 states where Republicans control the 
state government. These differences are important because state water planning occurs at 
the state government level. Elected leaders from these parties – particularly the governor 
and the state legislatures – have considerable power in appointing state agency leaders 
who, in turn, are responsible for state water planning efforts. Although much of the water 
planning effort is technical in nature, political considerations may also influence water 
plan content and approaches. As Chapter 3 demonstrated, this is particularly true as it 
relates to incorporating climate change into the planning effort. In Texas, where 
Republicans dominate the state political institutions, there is likely to be an aversion to 
incorporating climate change projections into planning whereas in California, there is 




represent the political opinions of their states with the Democratic party to the left 
ideologically is consistent with previous studies (e.g., Erikson, Wright Jr., & McIver, 
1989).  
Another piece of evidence of the political differences between the two states is the 
opinion pieces in the popular media that describe and/or advocate for the political 
environment in one state. For example, economist Tyler Cowen (2013) opined that the 
“Texas model” that includes reducing regulation, reducing government’s influence, and 
reducing taxes is increasingly becoming a goal for the nation at large. Texas Monthly 
senior editor Erica Grieder (2014) published a book entitled Big, Hot, Cheap, and Right: 
What America Can Learn From the Strange Genius of Texas where she agreed with 
Cowen’s premise. Both Cowen and Grieder include comparisons with California noting 
the recent migration patterns have included more Californians moving to Texas than vice 
versa. They characterize many of these migrants as economically motivated people who 
are lured by lower housing costs, better economic opportunities that exist, at least in part, 
because of the more limited government and lower tax burden in Texas. 
California’s defenders, meanwhile, have noted that California’s economic 
numbers have recently turned from downward to upward due, in part, to political 
leadership (Vauhini, 2015). They also note that California, although the cost of living is 
more expensive, has higher incomes and remains the nation’s center for technology 
innovation. California’s defenders attribute some of this to California’s regulatory 







4.3.1 Recent drought 
Texas and California have arguably experienced the worst two droughts in the 
nation between 2010 and 2015. One consensus approach to describing drought is the 
interagency US Drought Monitor (Svoboda et al., 2002). The US Drought Monitor is 
jointly produced by the National Drought Mitigation Center at the University of 
Nebraska-Lincoln, the US Department of Agriculture, and the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration. This tool depicts drought spatially over the US using a four 
category ranking system. The worst category, D4, is used for areas for drought related 
data (e.g., precipitation, snowpack, river flow, etc.) in the bottom two percentile of their 
historic values. Put another way, the D4 category shows areas experiencing the worst 
drought expected in a 50-year period of record. Texas’s most recent drought culminated 
in 2011 with the drought monitor showing its most extreme category, D4, over most of 
the state (Figure 4.2). This drought caused widespread reductions in water supply 
especially for agriculture although cities and towns were also impacted with some smaller 
towns actually trucking in water as their local supplies were depleted.  
California’s ongoing drought began in 2012 and is continuing at least through 
2015 with most of the state experiencing D4 conditions by 2015 (Figure 4.3). This 
drought was particularly extreme in 2014 with much of the state receiving less than 50% 
of its average annual precipitation. In 2015, the mountain snowpack, which is critical to 
water resources in the state, has been at or near record low values. In the midst of these 





4.3.2 Climate change vulnerabilities 
The 2014 National Climate Assessment noted that the southwestern US is at 
particular risk for diminishing precipitation and water resources as the mean storm track 
shifts to the north (Georgakakos et al., 2014). Figure 4.4 shows the projected risk index in 
2050 for water resources sustainability both with and without climate change. Both 
scenarios show a dramatic increase in this risk for the southwestern states and California 
and Texas, in particular. California and Texas share a similar vulnerability to future 
shortages not just from droughts but also from diminishing long term trends in 
precipitation as the climate changes. 
 
4.3.3 Growing cities and demographics 
The populations of California and Texas are similar in many ways. According to 
the 2010 census, California has nearly 39 million people, Texas has nearly 27 million 
(Census, 2011). Both states are growing faster than the national average with Texas 
growing at 5.2% and California at 2.9%. Proportionately, both states are more racially 
diverse than the US as a whole – they have the same percentage of Hispanic populations 
(38.4%) and similar percentages of white populations. They are also younger than the US 
as a whole. Having said this, there are also relevant and significant differences between 
the two states. California’s higher education rate is higher than the nation’s average 
whereas Texas’s is lower than the US average. Texas has a higher rate of poverty than 
California and the nation. Nevertheless, looking across the categories tracked by the US 





4.3.4 Water Resource Management 
Although they operate differently, both California and Texas have made major 
investments measured in billions of dollars in water resources. In Texas, the Texas Water 
Development Board (TWDB) was established in 1957 and is the state agency responsible 
for state water planning, information, financial assistance to local water agencies, 
conservation, and the responsible development of water resources (TWDB, 2015). 
Through its planning efforts, it assesses water needs around the state and makes financial 
loans to local governments to build and operate water resources infrastructure projects 
such as reservoirs and canals. TWDB is also the agency responsible for the state water 
plan. In California, the Department of Water Resources (DWR) was established in 1956, 
primarily to design, construct, and operate the State Water Project, the largest state built 
water project in the nation (DWR, 2015). Since then, DWR’s mission has expanded to 
include protection of and planning for the state’s water resources as a whole. It is the 
agency responsible for the state water plan.  
Both TWDB and DWR have produced water plans since the late 1950s with 
updates every 5-10 years. In both cases, the plans assess current and future water 
resources and make recommendations for addressing deficiencies. In both cases, the 
recommendations are primarily directed at the state government and are not binding.  
Both states are also facing long-term imbalances as demand for water is outpacing 
supply. Water plans in both states document that the rapidly increasing urban populations 
are the primary culprits for this change. As the urban populations grow, their need for 
water increases; at the same time, growing land footprints for urban areas in both states 




from agriculture to municipalities (the food needs for these growing cities will 
presumably be increasingly met by increasing imports from outside the state but this is 
not something considered in either state’s water plan).   
 
4.4 Texas’s 2012 Water Plan 
State water planning in Texas dates back to the 1957 water planning act passed by 
the state legislature. Since then, there have been nine state water plans, including the 
2012 update (TWDB, 2012). Each update has assessed the state’s water resources 
situation both at the time of the plan and projected into the future. The plans also make 
non-binding recommendations for the state legislature and regional water authorities on 
how to meet projected demands and changes. In recent years, the state has increasingly 
relied on and required regional water planning efforts from which the state water plan is 
increasingly derived. The TWDB has identified sixteen regions within the state for the 
purposes of this regional planning effort. 
The 2012 water plan begins with a letter from the TWDB board chair stating in 
part that “the primary message of the 2012 State water plan is a simple one: In serious 
drought conditions, Texas does not and will not have enough water to meet the needs of 
its people, businesses, and its agricultural enterprises” (TWDB, 2012, p. iii). The plan 
goes on to describe the economic importance of water for the state and the consequences 
to the economy should there be insufficient water to meet needs in the future.  
Fifty-year projections are made for each of six major water consumer categories: 
municipal, manufacturing, mining, steam-electric, livestock, and irrigation. These 




Texas Office of the State Demographer and the Texas State Data Center. The statewide 
population projection shows a near doubling of Texas’s population from 25 million in 
2010 to 46 million in 2060 (TWDB, 2012, p. 132). Regional population projections are 
combined with regional information on water trends within each of the water consumer 
categories to produce projected water demands for each region and each water consumer 
category. Aggregated to the state-level, these projections show a near doubling of 
municipal needs from 4.9 million acre-feet (maf) to 8.4 maf in 2060. Conversely, 
irrigation needs are projected to decrease from 10 maf to 8.4 maf in 2060. These changes 
are largely based on the population projections, their impact on converting agricultural 
land to urban land, and also expected efficiencies in agricultural water usage. The other 
four water consumer categories, mining, manufacturing, steam-electric, and livestock, 
utilize much smaller amounts of water and are next projected to change significantly over 
the next fifty years. 
Water supply projections are based on expected changes in infrastructure projects, 
including completion of planned projects and deterioration of existing ones. These are 
also calculated regionally and aggregated statewide to produce a statewide estimate of 
water supply. Figure 4.5 shows the statewide water demand projection together with the 
water supply projection. This figure shows gradual increases in water demand with a 
much smaller decrease in projected supply over time. Importantly, this figure also shows 
water demand exceeding water supply for the entire 50-year projected period.  
Although the water plan considers population and water demand projections in 
detail, climate change projections are dealt with awkwardly. After a discussion of 




Change’s fourth assessment report (Solomon, 2007), the water plan acknowledges that a 
changing climate would have impacts on Texas’s water resources. The water plan even 
highlights and describes the “Far West Texas Climate Change Conference” convened by 
the TWDB, at which participants recommended a “regional approach to considering 
climate change in regional water planning” (TWDB, 2012, p. 153). However, ultimately, 
the water plan concludes: 
Until better information is available to determine the impacts of climate 
variability on water supplies and water management strategies evaluated during 
the planning process, regional water planning groups can continue to use safe 
yield (the annual amount of water that can be withdrawn from a reservoir for a 
period of time longer than the drought of record) and to plan for more water than 
required to meet needs, as methods to address uncertainty and reduce risks. 
TWDB will continue to monitor climate policy and science and incorporate new 
developments into the cyclical planning process when appropriate. TWDB will 
also continue stakeholder and multi-disciplinary involvement on a regular basis to 
review and assess the progress of the agency’s efforts. (TWDB, 2012, p. 154) 
 
Remarkably, the water plan considers in detail quantitative projections for 
population and water demand, acknowledges the considerable uncertainty in those, but 
concludes there is too much uncertainty in climate change projections for them to be 
useful. One can practically see the political fingerprints on this statement and this 
approach. 
The water plan also contains a chapter devoted to risk and uncertainty. It 
acknowledges the importance of the risk and uncertainty both in water supply and 
demand projections into the future. Interestingly, the water plan devotes considerable 
effort to validating the population and water demand projections including a lengthy 
discussion evaluating past projections from the previous seven Texas water plans for 
2010. Through that analysis, the plan notes that there is considerable uncertainty 




state over time. However, with respect to climate change, the water plan notes the 
“TWDB has taken a number of steps to address uncertainty related to climate variability 
in the regional planning process. The agency monitors climate science for applicability to 
the planning process, consults with subject experts, and solicits research… TWDB will 
continue to monitor drought conditions to determine if a new drought of record occurs, 
which would change water planning assumptions” (TWDB, 2012, p. 232). Certainly, by 
that point, it would be much too late to plan for such a drought occurring.  
The water plan concludes with six recommendations. The first two 
recommendations are for building new reservoirs. The third recommendation is to 
improve the ability to transfer surface water from one basin to another. The fourth 
recommendation is to adjust the process by which ground water permits are approved. 
Fifth, the water plan recommends improving water system efficiencies to reduce system 
loss (e.g., leaks in the systems). Finally, the plan calls on the state legislature to provide 
financial backing for the water plan’s infrastructure projects. Collectively, these goals 
include elements of infrastructure investment, environmental protection (largely to 
support infrastructure investment), and sustained public investment in water resources as 
well as regional self-reliance and reliability. 
Public reaction to the water plan was largely one of indifference. A Proquest 
Newstand search produced only a couple of dozen media references to the 2012 water 
plan and most of those simply repeated the TWDB’s press release content. There was 
some discussion around the balance between conservation and infrastructure investments 
proposed in the water plan. Notably, the Nature Conservancy backed the plan noting that 




water challenges, but clearly recognizes the important role conservation must play in 
those efforts” ("Nature Conservancy Endorses Early Legislative Efforts to Fund the 
Texas Water Plan," 2013, p. 1). It is interesting that neither the Nature Conservancy nor 
anyone else commented on the water plan’s treatment of climate change.  
 
4.5 California’s 2013 Water Plan 
California’s first water plan was adopted shortly after the establishment of 
California’s Department of Water Resources (DWR) in 1957. The original plan has been 
updated ten times since then, including the 2013 update examined here (DWR, 2014). 
Each update has assessed the state’s current and future water resources demands and 
supplies relying on available data and science. Typically the water plan updates have 
reported that insufficient water resources will be available to meet future needs and have 
presented recommendations to address that deficit, including infrastructure projects and 
conservation. Scholars have made this observation as far back as the 1990s (e.g., Gleick, 
1998). Recognizing this, California’s 2013 water plan update was developed in parallel 
with the California Water Action Plan, a water initiative from the California governor’s 
office developed by the California Natural Resources Agency (CNRA, 2014). Whereas 
the water plan focuses on current and long-term risks to water resources, the Water 
Action Plan focused “on roadmap for the first five years of the state’s journey toward 
sustainable water management” (CNRA, 2014, p. 1). The two plans are interlinked and 
extensively cross referenced. For example, the Water Action Plan identified 10 essential 
actions. The water plan identified 17 objectives, which were mapped onto each of the ten 




place indicates a high level of political interest in water in the state. 
The water plan includes a comprehensive assessment of annual water resource 
supply and usage both statewide and regionally over the previous decade. This 
assessment quantifies annual supplies into four project categories (Colorado River, the 
USBR Central Valley Project, the DWR State Water Project, and local projects) as well 
as local imports, groundwater extraction, reuse, recycled, and instream environmental 
flows. Water usage is quantified for the following categories: urban, irrigated agriculture, 
managed wetlands, required Delta outflow, instream flows, and wild and scenic rivers.  
Climate change is discussed repeatedly throughout the water plan including in the 
background discussion motivating the imperative to act: 
Specific consequences of climate change are that higher temperatures will melt 
the Sierra snowpack earlier and drive the snowline higher, resulting in higher 
peak flood flows and less snowpack to supply water to California users. Rainfall 
events may become more frequent and intense, contributing to increased flood 
risk. Droughts may become more frequent and persistent this century. 
Accelerating sea level rise will produce higher storm surges during coastal storms. 
Together, higher winter runoff and sea level rise will increase the probability of 
levee failures in the Delta. Sea level rise will also place additional constraints on 
water management and exports from the Delta, especially as a result of increased 
salinity from tidal exchange in the Delta. By the end of the 21st century, the 
magnitudes of the largest floods may increase from 110 to 150 percent of 
historical magnitudes. (DWR, 2014, pp. 2-12) 
 
The water plan goes on to describe in detail expected impacts from climate 
change in water supply, ecosystems, water and power operations, flooding and drought, 
and coast and delta. 
In addition to the qualitative discussion on climate change, the water plan uses 
quantitative information through scenario development. Projections of future water 
demand and supply are generated to inform policy recommendations in the water plan. 




uncertainty (Groves & Bloom, 2013). One hundred ninety-eight scenarios are used based 
on all combinations of 3 population growth scenarios, 3 development density scenarios, 
and 22 climate scenarios. Population growth and development density scenarios were 
developed by the University of California at Davis. Each set of three scenarios includes 
one current trend, one at a lower rate, and one at a higher rate. Acres of irrigated land 
surface and agriculture were calculated based on the expected urban encroachment into 
agricultural lands from these scenarios. Climate scenarios were adopted from the 
Governor’s Climate Action Team (12 scenarios) plus 10 scenarios utilizing historical data 
with a warming trend imposed. Collectively, these scenarios were then used to compute 
regional scenarios for water supply, agricultural water demand, and urban water demand. 
Demand scenarios are shown in Figure 4.6. Water management strategies were then 
tested against each scenario to determine the reliability of water supplies for urban and 
agricultural areas in regions of California’s central valley. The southern central valley 
(Tulare Lake region) was found to be the least reliable with a majority of scenarios 
resulting in system failures for both agricultural and urban water systems in that region. 
By contrast, the Sacramento River region further to the north was shown to have greater 
system reliability with most urban systems having near 100% reliability across all 
scenarios. Figure 4.7 shows the reliability for urban and agricultural scenarios across the 
three major regions.  
The 2050 scenarios are then used to inform strategies and recommendations both 
in the California water plan and in the Water Action Plan. In the water plan, strategies are 
organized around three themes: integrated water management, strengthening government 




articulates a roadmap with a vision, seven goals, 10 guiding principles, 17 objectives, and 
about 300 actions with performance measures. The roadmap is based on the vision that 
the “water system provides the certainty needed for quality of life, sustainable, economic 
growth, business vitality, and agricultural productivity. California’s unique biological 
diversity, ecological values, and cultural heritage are protected and have substantially 
recovered” (DWR, 2014, p. 8.7). The water plan roadmap goals include elements of 
environmental protection (“protect, preserve and enhance watersheds” (DWR, 2014, p. 
8.7)), social justice (“benefits and consequences of water decisions … are equitable 
across all communities” (DWR, 2014, p. 8.8)), sustained public investment in water 
resources, regional self-reliance and reliability, and preparedness for uncertainty 
including climate change.  
Like Texas, public reception of the 2013 water plan was largely indifference. A 
Proquest Newstand search revealed only a handful of media outlets commented on the 
plan. Those that did mostly just repeated the talking points from the DWR press release 
announcing the water plan release. One exception was the Contra Costa Times whose 
editorial entitled “All Must Get Involved in Water Debates” called on the populace to 
understand the water plan and to “channel your inner wonk and get involved in the 
discussion to create access to this essence of life” ("All Must Get Involved in Water 
Debates," 2014). There is little evidence their readers or even their own reporters 
followed this advice.  
DWR did survey the public for its perception of water supply threats to and 
security of the water supply. Respondents to the DWR survey indicated large majorities 




water supplies and they were concerned about the effect of climate change on future 
water supplies (DWR, 2014, pp. 5.54-55).  
 
4.6 Comparison and Discussion 
The first order goal of both California and Texas in their water plans is to identify 
and address issues regarding their water resources supply and usage. To do so, however, 
the two states take two very different paths. Table 4.1 presents a summary of Texas and 
California’s water plans by key attributes including publication year, length, water supply 
and demand projection methodology and output, and policy goals.  
 
4.6.1 Treatment of uncertainty 
Both states identify planning for uncertainty as an important element of their 
plans, including narratives identifying sources of uncertainty and articulating the 
importance of tracking those sources over time. However, the plans differ significantly in 
their actual analysis and the use of uncertainty within them. Whereas California utilized a 
scenario approach to explicitly represent uncertainty through scenarios of population 
growth, growth patterns, and climate change, Texas employed a single value projection 
accounting only for changes in population and infrastructure. Furthermore, Texas’s 
approach did not quantify the uncertainty even in the elements it projected to change 
although it did include a quantitative analysis of past population projections from which 
uncertainty could be derived and applied to the projections it used. In contrast, 
California’s scenario method for computing different futures, based on different 




water plan and in regions of California, rich information from which to plan. Each 
scenario essentially represents a future contingency to plan to test the reliability of the 
current and proposed future water systems. From that, California water planners can 
demonstrate the resilience of their system to multiple scenarios. Of course, there are 
sources of uncertainty that are not represented by the California scenarios including 
future population and climate scenarios beyond those included in the plan as well as 
unknown uncertainties. Planners in both states will need to consider reliability broadly to 
ensure they are prepared, to the extent they can be, for these scenarios.  
 
4.6.2 Climate change 
Although climate change is expected to impact the water supply of both states 
similarly through a reduction in precipitation (e.g., Figure 4.3), the treatment of climate 
change in their respective water plans is a major contrast. Texas’s water plan essentially 
pays lip service to climate change through hosting a workshop and promising to follow 
future research on the impact of climate change on water resources. Beyond relatively 
noncommittal actions, Texas’s plan essentially ignores the changing climate. Neither the 
water supply projections nor the demand projections include or address climate change at 
all. In stark contrast, California’s water plan explicitly identifies adapting to climate 
change as one of its goals and includes extensive discussion of climate change throughout 
the plan. The water supply and demand scenarios rely heavily on climate change 






4.6.3 Public reception 
The general public indifference to the water plans was common to both states. 
Consistent with literature (e.g., Page et al., 1987), this suggests that in technical and/or 
complex issues such as water management, the public is generally willing to delegate 
policy making to technocrats such as water planners.  
California’s plan included an analysis of public opinion that Texas’s did not; this 
suggests that California’s planners are perhaps interested in at least documenting public 
opinion as a supporting element for their plan, if not actually using that opinion to shape 
their plan. This suggests California’s planning effort may be somewhat more egalitarian 
than Texas’s.  
 
4.6.4 Policy choices 
Both Texas and California conclude their plans with a series of nonbinding 
recommendations. These are summarized at the end of Table 4.1. Texas’s plan follows 
the model of a traditional water plan with its emphasis on infrastructure – particularly 
reservoir – development proposals as the major means of achieving long-term 
sustainability and reliability of water supplies. It promotes specific projects, and calls on 
the state legislature to fund and/or provide financial assistance for these projects. It calls 
on regional planning and authorities to be self-reliant and to execute these projects. It also 
includes a call for environmental protection within the watershed of proposed projects in 
order to preserve their effectiveness as a water resources project.  
California’s plan takes a different path. Although it embraces the importance of 




where flooding, environmental, and water supply needs are balanced against each other. 
It not only calls out the use of best available science and data as goals, it actually uses 
them in its plan. Unlike Texas, California calls out social justice as a goal and 
acknowledges the unequal access to water that currently exists in the state as a problem. 
Also, in contrast to Texas, environmental protection is identified as a goal in its own right 
rather than simply as a means of justifying an infrastructure project. 
Clearly these paths are different. Whereas the traditional water development path 
that Texas has chosen has been followed before by many governments around the world 
(including California), the path that California has chosen is relatively novel. The results 
of the traditional path are relatively well understood including its benefits for system 
reliability. However, these results are understood in the context of a stationary rather than 
changing climate. One of the premises of California’s water plan is that new strategies 
are needed to address not only the changing climate but also the realities of crossing 
supply and demand curves. California also notes that its current crisis is the result of 
having followed the traditional water management approach. Time will tell where these 
paths lead. As many have noted, the states are laboratories for democracy and different 
policies emerge from different populations with different preferences. That contrast is 
particularly evident in California and Texas – two similar states with very different 
politics.  
 
4.7 Beyond Texas and California 
To what extent are Texas and California representative of Republican and 




presidential voting in predicting the inclusion of climate science in state water planning, 
there was considerable variance in the relationship between these variables. In particular, 
outliers are evident in Figure 3.5 showing state water plan rankings plotted against the 
state presidential vote. Two of the major outliers are New Mexico, a reliably Democratic 
state with a water plan ranking of one, and Oklahoma, a reliable Republican state with a 
water plan ranking of four.  
New Mexico’s 2013 water plan update is a brief document – only 66 pages. 
Although it eloquently describes the need to adapt to changing water conditions, it is 
silent on the implications of a changing climate within the state. It also lacks much of the 
quantitative detail that is evident in California’s and Texas’s plans. It has many pictures 
but only one plot in the entire document. I speculate that this document is reflective of the 
capacity and sophistication of the state water agency responsible for drafting the state 
water plan. If New Mexico’s water agency had the resources and depth of expertise that 
California or other larger states had, it would very likely have a more quantitative water 
plan and would also account for climate change. It is also possible that New Mexico’s 
uniquely large Native American and Hispanic populations may shape the state’s water 
and climate strategies in ways that are different from other states. 
 Oklahoma is another interesting outlier case from Figure 3.5. Oklahoma’s 2012 
water plan contains very detailed watershed analyses and projections that consider 
climate change in a manner similar to California. In the course of drafting this 
dissertation, I had the opportunity to participate in meetings with the state water agencies 
from several states including Oklahoma. Although the focus of those meetings was not on 




and interaction that the Oklahoma Water Resources Board has a high level of engineering 
and analytical capacity. In addition, their leadership has a high level of political acumen 
to work with their state’s conservative political leadership to address areas like climate 
change that are politically sensitive but important for managing the water resources of the 
state. I speculate that these two attributes, capacity and political acumen, are key in 
explaining Oklahoma’s deviation in Figure 3.5. 
 Capacity of water agencies, therefore, may be an important variable to consider 
across states. California’s DWR is a vast department with experience in not only 
generating water plans but also in operating massive water projects and all that that 
entails. In contrast, New Mexico’s Office of the State Engineer has a diverse portfolio of 
responsibilities including water planning with a much smaller budget and staff than 
California. Operationalizing the capacity variable into a study like this one could be done 
through an analysis of budget and/or staff resources at the state-level for water resource 
planning. Obtaining these data in a consistent manner and accounting for the different 
populations and sizes of the states would be somewhat challenging. Nonetheless, this 





Table 4.1: Comparison of Texas and California water plans. 
 
Attribute Texas California 
Update Examined 2012 2013/2014 
Page Count 299 3000+ 
Time Horizon 2060 2050 
Projection methodology Single projection with 
qualitative discussion on 
uncertainty 
198 scenario projections 
quantifying uncertainty 
together with qualitative 
uncertainty 
Projection inputs Population Population, Growth density, 
Precipitation, Temperature 
Projection outputs Water demand by six 
categories and regionally 
Water supply and demand 
scenarios regionally by 
urban and agriculture 
Water plan policy goals Infrastructure development 
Environmental protection 
Sustained public investment 




Sustained public investment 



















Figure 4.2: US drought monitor for September 27, 2011. Reprinted with permission from 
the National Drought Mitigation Center – University of Nebraska Lincoln (NDMC-
UNL). The U.S. Drought Monitor is jointly produced by the National Drought Mitigation 
Center at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, the United States Department of 
Agriculture, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Map courtesy of 






Figure 4.3: US Drought Monitor for March 17, 2015. Reprinted with permission from the 
National Drought Mitigation Center – University of Nebraska Lincoln (NDMC-UNL). 
The U.S. Drought Monitor is jointly produced by the National Drought Mitigation Center 
at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, the United States Department of Agriculture, and 










Figure 4.4: Water resource risk index. Reprinted with permission from Roy et al. (2012) 
as it appeared in the Third National Climate Assessment (Georgakakos et al., 2014). 






Figure 4.5: Projected water supply and demand for Texas. Reprinted with permission 










Figure 4.6: California projected water demand using scenario approach. Reprinted with 









Figure 4.7: Projected reliability of California’s major agriculture and uran water systems. 
“Circles indicate urban reliability results, and diamonds indicate agricultural reliability 
results. Blue, green, and orange symbols correspond to results for the Sacramento River, 
San Joaquin River, and Tulare Lake hydrologic regions, respectively.” (DWR, 2014, 
















CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
The overall drive of this study has been to identify motivating variables for 
governments and individuals to form policy preferences for addressing climate change in 
planning at the state-level. In particular, water planning was chosen as the substantive 
focus because of both its major importance to all aspects of life and the documented 
impacts of climate change on water resources. Various motivating variables including 
vulnerability to climate change, recent experience with drought and natural disasters, 
political preferences, and education were considered. All variables were tested for 
significance in predicting for incorporation of climate change impacts in state-level water 
planning using regression models and data from between 2007 and 2014. The only 
consistently significant predictor across differing permutations of the models was 
political preference as expressed through presidential vote. To further examine this 
quantitative study result using a different research method, the last empirical chapter 
presented a comparative case study. This study compared water planning in two states, 
Texas and California, with very different politics but otherwise similar populations, 
experience with drought and water resource challenges, and vulnerability to climate 




significantly more likely than Republican states to incorporate projections for the 
changing climate in their water plans.  
These studies also showed considerable unexplained variance (e.g., in Figures 3.5 
and 3.6). Although much of the differences between state approaches to addressing 
climate change in their water planning and state hazard mitigation planning efforts can be 
explained by political differences. Many of the differences are not explained by political 
differences or the other variables considered in this study. Understanding these 
differences requires further and deeper investigation along the lines of the comparison 
study in Chapter 4 for Texas and California. For example, understanding and 
operationalizing variable(s) to describe water agency capacity, resources, and political 
acumen are likely critical to explaining the water planning in New Mexico and 
Oklahoma.  
While this study produced robust results across different research methods and 
different configurations of modeling and data, it does have limitations. Limitations 
include data, sample size, sampling, and timeliness. The data used in this study were 
drawn from different sources with varying levels of measurement. For example, the lack 
of a consistent state-level data set on water resources vulnerability that led to the 
aggregation of the Padowski and Jawitz (2012) city-level data to state-level in this study, 
(Chapter 3) was a challenge this study overcame. Sample size is another limitation. Using 
state-level data, the largest possible sample is 50, but this study often included fewer 
states. This was particularly the case for the water plans as only 29 out of 50 states have 
water plans. Although the sample size limitation was partially mitigated by running 




the results are fundamentally limited to the data available. The samples themselves (e.g., 
state-level data) are also quite diverse in their depth. Water planning is much more 
limited in scope for smaller states than it is for larger states. Finally, the results are 
necessarily time bound. Chapter 2 demonstrated that the drivers for climate change policy 
preferences at the state-level have evolved over time with more recent results showing a 
stronger connection between partisan identification and policy preferences on climate 
change. As policy and political drivers continue to change into the future, the 
relationships documented will likely continue to evolve as well and should, therefore, be 
reassessed over time.  
Even with these limitations, the results of this study have implications both for 
future research and for practitioners in water resources planning. 
 
5.1 Opportunities for Research 
Future research should build on this study in at least five areas: improving data, 
testing results on a different unit of analysis, comparing with research studying risk 
management on different time and space scales, further exploring the linkage between 
water planning and politics, and testing state planning efforts in other areas for similar 
relationships.  
As previously discussed, one of the challenges in conducting this study was the 
available data. The most limiting aspect was the lack of an existing, robust dataset on 
state-level water vulnerability. As the US water census (USGS, 2015) that Congress 
funded the USGS to conduct in order to quantify water systematically across the country 




data will be available including new polling data similar to the Pew (2010) dataset, data 
from future election results, and new water plans. Each of these datasets will provide an 
opportunity to repeat this study. There will also be increasing opportunities for 
conducting longitudinal studies over time to assess how the relationships between 
predictor variables and water planning evolve. Moreover, as the pace of climate change 
accelerates and its impacts on water resources become more evident over the coming 
years, that too will provide an interesting basis for research into how states that currently 
ignore climate change might change their planning approach to incorporate climate 
change projections.  
Second, repeating this study with a different unit of analysis, water district 
planning, would be revealing. In particular, a unit of analysis focused on water districts 
with responsibility for providing water to their customers would be very interesting. 
Water districts are typically much smaller than states, more removed from the politics 
than state government, and, unlike most states, have direct responsibility for providing 
water. Water districts are typically run by professional directors with engineering 
backgrounds. Their governance structures vary widely although directors generally report 
to a governing body with representatives elected by the voters in the district or appointed 
by elected leaders in the district. Perhaps because water districts are singularly focused on 
water, their governing bodies tend to be much less partisan and political than state 
legislatures and governors that ultimately oversee state water planning efforts. It is 
therefore likely that at the water district level, district directors would have more latitude 
in their planning efforts generally but also specifically to consider climate change than at 




at the water district level. However, such a study would be challenged to collect the 
political data needed as those datasets are not readily available at the water district level. 
In addition, as with states, water districts vary considerably in size and planning 
capabilities. Controlling for those differences could conceivably be done using a case 
study approach similar to Chapter 4. 
Planning for major river basins that include multiple states, countries, and/or 
water districts is another unit of analysis that offers an interesting scale for future 
research questions (e.g., Feldman, 2013). Unlike the state or water district level, there is 
not typically a single water management agency responsible for planning or governing 
water across the major river basin. Instead, water at the major river basin scale is 
typically governed by long standing treaties or compacts between the states, countries, 
and/or water districts with interests in the basin. These governing instruments may be 
amended over time to address challenges, conflicts, or evolving needs by the signatories. 
An example of a major river basin is the Colorado River basin that encompasses seven 
states and two countries and provides a setting for examining the water planning of 
multiple entities with a shared resource. Water in the Colorado River Basin is allocated 
between the seven US states according to the 1922 Colorado Compact, subsequent 
agreements between the states, and legal decrees from the US court system. Water is 
allocated between the US and Mexico according to the 1944 Mexican Water Treaty and 
its amendments. In the context of this study, how do plans for a resource shared among 
politically diverse states consider climate change? The Colorado River Basin includes 
states like California that have demonstrated a desire to plan for a changing climate but 




the federal government in partnership with the seven basin states is fertile ground for 
such a study (USBR, 2010).  
 A third avenue of future research is a comparison of the relative importance and 
application of science and of politics in water planning with crisis management for other 
natural phenomena such as flooding or earthquakes. In each of those phenomena, there is 
both a body of scientific knowledge around predicting and understanding the phenomena 
itself and political policy choices around mitigating or reducing the impacts. For flooding 
this would include construction of flood control facilities such as dams, levees, etc., and 
for earthquakes there is emerging evidence of the impact of hydraulic fracturing leading 
to increased earthquake activity. Moreover, there is considerable literature on ways that 
different cultures consider and act on risk. For example, Bernhardsdottir (2013) examines 
how four different types of cultures (fatalism, individualism, hierarchy, and 
egalitarianism) perceive risk in crisis management. In this context, Texas might be 
characterized as more individualistic and California as more egalitarian. This 
characterization could be refined and tested in policy areas outside of water planning and 
used to predict planning tendencies.  
Next, although this study documented partisan based policy differences in how 
state water plans address climate change, it leaves unanswered how exactly those 
political preferences manifest themselves into state policy.  Are water planners in 
Democratic states more likely to address climate change because they themselves are 
more predisposed to it? Are they receiving direction from their political leadership? And 
how does that work in the “outlier” states such as Republican Oklahoma that addressed 




ignored it? These differences were discussed at the end of Chapter 4 and water agency 
capacity was proposed as a possible variable to further explain differences between 
states. Understanding these exceptions might shed light on what other drivers exist. 
Finally, future research should examine state planning efforts in other areas to test 
if similar relationships are observed with incorporating climate change within those plans 
and the partisan composition of the state electorate. States that routinely generate plans in 
a myriad of areas will likely be impacted by climate change including transportation, 
public health, land use, energy, and even climate adaptation. Plans within each of these 
areas could be assessed in a manner similar to this study to both assess planning within 
different substantive areas of planning and to compare results with water planning and 
hazard mitigation planning. Do some areas of planning incorporate climate change more 
than others? Are some areas of planning more buffered from politics than others? Are 
plans within a particular state consistent in how they address climate change? These 
questions might be addressed through a similar procedure as in this study to compare 
state hazard mitigation planning and state water planning (recall Table 3.3, for instance). 
Understanding differences in planning sensitivities to political pressures across 
substantive planning fields would illuminate motivators for planning in those fields. 
 
5.2 Implications for Practice 
 Water resource managers and those that support them may also benefit from the 
results of this study. There are at least three major implications for water resource 
planners, water management agencies, and their constituents: first is to understand their 




and practitioners to have open channels of communication.  
Like many professions, practitioners in water resources tend to focus on their craft 
and ignore the seemingly unconnected politics around them. However, this study 
demonstrated tangible differences in how states with different political leanings approach 
climate change. The California and Texas comparison also hinted at a different approach 
to planning for uncertainty beyond climate change (i.e. future population and urban vs. 
agricultural water demands). By better understanding the political agendas of their 
elected leaders and of the populations they serve, water resource practitioners will likely 
be better able to shape their own activities to meet those agendas but also to bring their 
own considerable expertise in water resource management to meet the water challenges 
of their customers in the most effective manner possible.  
Finally, water planners should track outcomes associated with their planning 
efforts. It is clear that the California and Texas water plans prescribe not only two very 
different types of investments but also articulate two different sets of goals. While both 
states are ultimately interested in meeting the water needs of their state, they diverge 
considerably on both what that means and how they will get there. Whereas Texas 
proposes traditional investments in infrastructure expansion and conservation, California 
proposes investments in the environment and in socially equitable distribution of water 
resources. Water agencies should carefully measure how the prescriptions in their plans 
make progress to their stated goals. Over time, the relative success of each strategy 
should be assessed and contrasted with other strategies. Ultimately, this is how we learn. 
In releasing California’s water plan, California’s Secretary for Natural Resources, John 




water management where historic climate is assumed to represent future climate ("All 
Must Get Involved in Water Debates," 2014). California has developed a new model in 
its water plan. It should be tested and improved over time. 
As climate scientists themselves have pointed out in climate assessments, climate 
change will have pronounced impacts on water resources in many regions of the country. 
The state water plans and state hazard mitigation plans analyzed in this study shows 
considerable variability in how states recognize or incorporate climate change projections 
into their planning efforts. In some cases where states are either not acknowledging likely 
impacts of climate change in their planning narratives or are not incorporating climate 
change into their future scenarios that they plan to do so, there may not be sufficient 
communication between planners and the climate science community. These 
communities should be communicating with each other to ensure that planners have 
access to the best available science for their planning efforts and that scientists are aware 
of the thresholds and planning requirements so they can tailor their activities to produce 
relevant information.  
Overall, understanding the connections between politics and the activities 
undertaken by political entities is critical for anyone seeking to influence either the 
politics or the activities of the state. This study demonstrated both the impact of politics 
on state planning activities and the presence of exceptions. For those seeking to better 
connect government activities to the policy preferences of elected leaders, this study 
offers broad support for the idea that elections do matter and that elected leaders do have 
considerable impact on state government planning in water and especially in hazard 




this study offers evidence that unelected government technocrats have power, particularly 












CODING SCHEME: CATEGORIZATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE TREATMENT IN 
STATE HAZARD MITIGATION AND STATE WATERPLANS 
 
Coding Instructions 
Background: FEMA requires each state to develop a State Hazard Mitigation 
Plan. These plans are intended to assess risks, organize resources, and establish a plan for 
mitigating risks with available resources. Each state is responsible for developing their 
own risk assessment and plan and presenting those in their State Hazard Mitigation Plan. 
As such, those plans address the hazards posed by climate change in different ways. 
Babcock (2013) defined an "intentionally broad" ranking system for categorizing how 
each state treats climate change. He used a four category system defined as follows: 
1. No discussion of climate change or inaccurate discussion of climate 
change 
2. Minimal mention of climate change related issues 
3. Accurate but limited discussion of climate change and/or brief discussion 
with acknowledgement of need for future inclusion 





States were qualitatively assigned to categories based on the following criteria: 
1. Effect of climate change considered (quantitatively, qualitatively, 
anecdotally) 
2. Adaptation to climate change considered (explicitly, implicitly, targeted, 
or general) 
3. Summary of climate change presentation 
In order to apply Babcock's (2013) to state water plans, the following coding 
schema is used to reproduce Babcock's (2013) rankings for state hazard mitigation plans 
before applying this schema to state water plans.  
 
Schema 
1. Search appropriate risk assessment documents for occurrences of "climate 
change." Assess surrounding text for criteria 1 (effect of climate change considered). If 
no discussion or grossly inaccurate discussion is present, assign state to category 1. If 
discussion is present, proceed to step 2. 
2. If climate change does not have its own section, is minimal in nature, and does 
not acknowledge the need for future inclusion, assign to category 2. Otherwise proceed to 
step 3. 
3. If there is a thorough discussion of the impacts of climate change on hazards 
identified and identification of climate adaptation actions, assign to category 4. Otherwise 
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